

Aristotle

Nicomachean
Ethics

Translated
With Introduction and Notes
By

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Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Indianapolis/Cambridge

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17 16 15 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

For further information, please address
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 44937
Indianapolis, Indiana 46244-0937

www.hackettpublishing.com

Composition by Aptara, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Aristotle.
[Nicomachean ethics. English]
Nicomachean ethics / Aristotle; translated with introduction and notes by
C.D.C. Reeve.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-62466-117-4 (pbk.)—ISBN 978-1-62466-118-1 (cloth)
1. Ethics. I. Reeve, C. D. C., 1948 translator. II. Title.
B430.A5R438 2014
171'.3—dc23 2013037301

Adobe PDF ebook ISBN: 978-1-62466-119-8

BOOK I

I 1

Every craft and every method of inquiry and likewise |1094*1| every action and deliberate choice seems to seek some good.¹ That is why they correctly declare that the good is “that which all seek.”²

A certain difference, however, appears to exist among ends.³ For some are activities while others are works of some sort beyond the activities themselves.⁴ |5| But wherever there are ends beyond the actions, in those cases, the works are naturally better than the activities. But since there are many sorts of actions and of crafts and sciences, their ends are many as well. For health is the end of medicine, a ship of shipbuilding, victory of generalship, and wealth of household management.⁵

Some of these fall under some one capacity, however, as |10| bridle making falls under horsemanship, along with all the others that produce equipment for horsemanship, and as it and every action in warfare fall under generalship, and, in the same way, others fall under different ones.⁶ But in all such cases, the ends of the architectonic ones are more choiceworthy than the ends under them, since these are pursued |15| for the sake also of the former.⁷ It makes no difference, though, whether the ends of the actions are the activities themselves or some other thing beyond them, just as in the sciences we have mentioned.⁸

I 2

If, then, there is some end of things doable in action that we wish for because of itself, and the others because of it, and we do not choose everything because of something else (since if *that* is the case, it will go on without limit |20| so that the desire will be empty and pointless), it is clear that this will be the good—that is, the best good.⁹ Hence regarding our life as well, won’t knowing the good have great influence and—like archers with a target—won’t we be better able to hit what we should?¹⁰ If so, |25| we should try to grasp in outline, at least, what the good is and to which of the sciences or capacities it properly belongs.¹¹

It would seem to be the one with the most control, and the most architectonic one.¹² And politics seems to be like this, since it is the one that prescribes which of the sciences need to exist in cities and

which ones each group in cities should learn and up to what point.¹³ |1094^b1| Indeed, we see that even the capacities that are generally most honored are under it—for example, generalship, household management, and rhetoric.¹⁴ And since it uses the other practical sciences and, furthermore, legislates about what must be done and what avoided, |5| its end will circumscribe those of the others, so that it will be the human good.¹⁵

For even if the good is the same for an individual and for a city, that of a city is evidently a greater and, at any rate, a more complete good to acquire and preserve.¹⁶ For while it should content us to acquire and preserve this for an individual alone, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a nation and city. And so |10| our method of inquiry seeks the good of these things, since it is a sort of politics.¹⁷

I 3

Our account will be adequate if its degree of perspicuity is in accord with its subject matter.¹⁸ For we must not look for the same degree of exactness in all accounts, any more than in all products of the crafts.¹⁹

Noble things and just things, which are what politics investigates, admit of so much difference and |15| variability that they seem to exist by conventional law alone and not by nature.²⁰ Good things seem to admit of variability in the same way too, because they result in harm in many cases, since some have in fact been destroyed because of wealth, others because of courage. So it should content us, in an account that concerns and is in accord with such things, to show the truth roughly and in outline, |20| and—in an account that concerns things that hold for the most part and is in accord with them—to reach conclusions of the same sort too.²¹ It is in the same way, then, that we also need to take each of the things we say. For it is characteristic of a well-educated person to look for the degree of exactness in each kind of investigation that the nature of the subject itself allows.²² |25| For it is evident that accepting persuasive arguments from a mathematician is like demanding demonstrations from a rhetorician.²³

But each person correctly discerns the things he knows and is a good discerner of these. Hence a person well educated in a given area is a good discerner *in that area*, while a person well educated in all areas is an unconditionally good discerner.²⁴ |1095^a1| That is why a young person is not a suitable audience for politics.²⁵ For he has no experience of the actions of life, and the accounts are in accord with these and concerned with these.²⁶

Further, since he tends to follow his feelings, it will be pointless and not beneficial for him to be in the audience, since the end is not |5| knowledge but action.²⁷ And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or immature in character, since the deficiency is not a matter of time but is due to living and pursuing each thing in accord with his feelings. For to people like that, knowledge turns out to be profitless in just the way it does to those who lack self-control.²⁸ For those who form their desires and do their actions in accord with reason, however, |10| it will be of great benefit to know about these things.

So much for the prefatory remarks concerning the audience, how our discussion is to be received, and what we are proposing to do.

I 4

Let us, then, resume our account. Since every sort of knowledge and every deliberate choice reaches after some good, let us say what it is |15| politics seeks—that is, what the topmost of all the good things doable in action is.

About its name, most people are pretty much agreed, since both ordinary people and sophisticated ones say it is “happiness” and suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy.²⁹ Concerning happiness, however, and what |20| it is, they are in dispute, and ordinary people do not give the same answer as wise ones. For ordinary people think it is one of the plainly evident things, such as pleasure or wealth or honor—some taking it to be one thing, others another. And often the same person thinks it is different things, since when he gets a disease, it is health, whereas when he is poor, it is wealth. But when these people are conscious of their own ignorance |25| they are wonder-struck by those who proclaim some great thing that is over their heads. And some people did used to think that, beyond these many good things, there is another intrinsically good one that causes all of them to be good.³⁰

Now it is presumably quite pointless to inquire into all these beliefs, and enough to inquire into those that are most prevalent or that seem to have some argument for them.³¹

We must not let it escape our notice, however, |30| that arguments leading from starting-points and arguments leading to starting-points are different.³² For Plato too was rightly puzzled about this and would inquire whether the route was leading from starting-points or to starting-points—as, in a stadium racecourse, that of the athletes may lead away from the starting-point toward the boundary or in the reverse

direction. |1095^b1| We must indeed start from things that are knowable. But things are knowable in two ways, since some are knowable to us, some unconditionally.³³ So presumably we should start from things knowable to us.

That is why we must be nobly brought up if, where noble things, just things, and the topics of politics as a whole are concerned, |5| we are to be an adequate audience.³⁴ For the starting-point is the fact that something is so, and, if this is sufficiently evident, we do not also need the explanation of why it is so.³⁵ A nobly brought up person, then, either has the starting-points or can easily get hold of them. And as for someone who neither has nor can get hold of them, he should listen to Hesiod:

Best of all is the one who understands everything himself, |10|
 Good too is that person who is persuaded by one that has spoken well.
 But he who neither understands it himself nor listening to
 another
 Takes it to heart, that one is a useless man.³⁶

I 5

But let us take up our account at the point where we digressed.³⁷ People seem (which is not unreasonable) to get their suppositions about the good—that is, happiness—from their lives.³⁸ |15| For ordinary people, the most vulgar ones, suppose it to be pleasure. And that is why the life they like is the life of indulgence. For there are three lives that stand out: the one we just mentioned, the political, and, third, the contemplative.³⁹

Now ordinary people do seem wholly slavish, because the life they deliberately choose is one that is characteristic of grazing cattle. |20| They have an argument for their choice, though, because many of those in positions of authority feel the same as Sardanapalus.⁴⁰

Sophisticated people, on the other hand, and doers of action, deliberately choose honor, since it is pretty much the end of the political life. It, however, is apparently more superficial than what we are looking for, since it seems to be in the hands of the honorers more than of the honorees, whereas |25| we have a hunch that the good is something that properly belongs to us and is difficult to take away.⁴¹ Further, people seem to pursue honor in order to be convinced that they are good—at any rate, they seek to be honored by practically-wise people, among people who know them, and for virtue.⁴² It is clear, then, that according to them, at least, virtue is better.

Maybe one might even suppose that *it* is more [30] the end of the political life than honor is. But even virtue is apparently too incomplete, since it seems possible to have virtue even while sleeping or being inactive throughout life or while suffering evils and bad luck of the worst sort. Someone who was living like *that*, however, [1096^a1] no one would call happy unless he was defending a thesis at all costs.⁴³ That is enough about these issues, since they have also been adequately discussed in the works that are in circulation.⁴⁴

The third life is the contemplative one, which we shall undertake to investigate in what follows.

The life of a moneymaker [5] is in a way forced, and wealth is clearly not the good we are looking for, since it is useful and for the sake of something else.⁴⁵ Hence we might be more inclined to suppose that the things already mentioned are the end, since they are liked because of themselves. But they are apparently not the end either—indeed, many arguments have been presented against them. So we may set them aside.⁴⁶ [10]

Feel free to skip section I6 and go to I7 if you'd like!

I 6

But perhaps we had better investigate the universal good and go through the puzzles concerning the way in which it is said of things, even if this sort of inquiry is an uphill one because the men who introduced the forms were friends of ours.⁴⁷ Yet it would seem better, perhaps, and something we should do, at any rate when the preservation of the truth is at stake, to confute even what is properly our own, most of all because we are philosophers. [15] For while we love both our friends and the truth, it is a pious thing to accord greater honor to the truth.

Those, then, who introduced this view did not posit forms for things among which they spoke of prior and posterior, which is why they did not furnish a form of the numbers.⁴⁸ But the good is said of things in the categories of what it is, quality, and relation, and [20] what is intrinsically—that is, substance—is naturally prior to relation (for a relation would seem to be an offshoot or coincidental attribute of what is), so that there will not be some common form set over these.⁴⁹

Further, good is said of things in as many ways as being. For it is said of things in the category of what it is (for example, the god and the understanding), in that of quality (the virtues), in that of quantity (the [25] moderate amount), in that of relation (the useful), in that of time (the opportune moment), in that of place (a livable dwelling), and so

on.⁵⁰ Thus it is clear that it will not be some common universal—that is, a “one.”⁵¹ For then it would not be said of things in all the categories but only in one.

Further, if of things that are in accord with one form there is also one science, then of all goods there would also be some one science.⁵² |30| But as things stand there are many, even of goods in one category—for example, of the opportune moment (for in war it is generalship but in disease medicine) and of the moderate amount (in food it is medicine but in physical exertion athletic training).

We might also raise puzzles about what they even mean by *each-thing-itself* if indeed of both human-itself |35| and human there is a single account—namely, that |1096^b1| of human.⁵³ For insofar as each is human, they will not differ at all, and neither will the corresponding “ones,” insofar as each is good.

Neither will the good-itself be more of a good by being eternal, if indeed a long-lasting white thing is no whiter than an ephemeral one.

The Pythagoreans seem to have something more convincing to say |5| about this, since they place the One in the column of goods—indeed, Speusippus seems to have followed their lead.⁵⁴

But let us leave these topics for another discussion.

A controversial point, however, does lie concealed in what we have said, because their arguments are not concerned with *every* good. Those said of things in accord with one form are those pursued and liked |10| as intrinsic goods, whereas those that tend to produce or safeguard these, or to prevent their contraries, are said to be good because of these and in a different way.⁵⁵ It is clear, then, that “good” would be said of things in two ways, that is, of some as intrinsic goods, of others as goods because of these. So let us separate off the intrinsic goods from the ones that produce a benefit, and investigate whether |15| intrinsic goods are said to be good in accord with a single form.

The intrinsic ones, though, what sorts of things should we suppose them to be? Or aren’t they the ones that are pursued on their own as well, such as thinking, seeing, and certain pleasures and honors? For even if we do pursue these because of other things, we might nonetheless suppose them to belong among the intrinsic goods. Or does nothing else belong there except the form? In that case, the form will be pointless.⁵⁶ |20| But if these other things belong among the intrinsic ones, the same account of the goodwill have to show up in all of them, just as that of whiteness does in snow and white lead. In fact, though, the accounts of honor, practical wisdom, and pleasure differ and are at variance regarding the very way in which they are goods.

Hence the good is not something common and in accord with a single |25| form.

But how, then, is it said of things? For at least it does not seem to be a case of homonymy resulting from luck.⁵⁷ Is it, then, that all goods at least derive from or are related to a single thing? Or is it more a matter of analogy? For as sight is in the case of body, so understanding is in the case of soul, and so on for other things in other cases.⁵⁸

But perhaps we should leave these questions aside for now, since an exact treatment of them more properly belongs to a different branch of philosophy.⁵⁹ |30| Similarly in the case of the form. For even if there is some single good predicated in common of all intrinsic goods, a separable one that is itself an intrinsic good, it is clear that it would not be doable in action or acquirable by a human being.⁶⁰ But that is the sort that is being looked for.

Maybe someone might think it better to get to know |35| the form in connection with the goods that *are* acquirable and doable in action. |1097*1| For they might think that by having it as a paradigm, we shall also better know those things that are good for us and—knowing them—aim at and hit them. This argument certainly has some plausibility but it seems to clash with the sciences. For each of these, though it seeks some good and looks for how to supply whatever is lacking, |5| leaves aside knowledge of the form. And yet for all craftsmen not to know—and not even to look for—so important an aid would hardly be reasonable.

There is a puzzle too about how a weaver or a carpenter will benefit, as regards his own craft, from knowing the good-itself or how anyone will be a better doctor or a better general from having seen the form-itself. |10| For the doctor does not even seem to investigate health in that way but, rather, human health, or perhaps, rather, the health of this human being, since it is the particular human being that he treats.

So much, then, for these topics.

If you skipped I6, resume here at I7!

I 7

Let us return to the good we are looking for and |15| what it could possibly be. For it is apparently different in different actions and different crafts, since it is one thing in medicine, a different one in generalship, and likewise for the rest. What, then, is the good characteristic of each? Or isn't it the thing for whose sake the rest of the actions are done? In medicine this is health, in generalship victory, in building a house, and in other crafts something else, and in |20| every action and deliberate choice it is the end, since it is for the sake of the end that everyone does

the rest of the actions. So if there is some end of all the things doable in action, this will be the good doable in action, and if there are more than one, it will be these.

Taking a different course, then, our account has reached the same conclusion.⁶¹ But we should try to make this yet more perspicuous.

Since there are evidently many |25| ends, and we choose some of them because of something else, as we do wealth, flutes, and instruments generally, it is clear that not all ends are complete. But the best one is apparently something complete.⁶² So if one thing alone is complete, this will be what we are looking for, but if there are more, it will be the most complete of them.

We say that |30| what is intrinsically worth pursuing is more complete than what is worth pursuing because of something else, that what is never choiceworthy because of something else is more complete than things that are both intrinsically choiceworthy and choiceworthy because of it, and that what is unconditionally complete, then, is what is always intrinsically choiceworthy and never choiceworthy because of something else.

Happiness seems to be most like this, since *it* we always choose because of itself and never because of something else. |1097^b1| But honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue, though we do choose them because of themselves as well (since if they had no further consequences, we would still take each of them), we also choose for the sake of happiness, supposing that because of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, |5| no one chooses for the sake of these things or because of anything else in general.

The same conclusion also apparently follows from self-sufficiency, since the complete good seems to be self-sufficient. By “self-sufficient,” however, we mean not self-sufficient for someone who is alone, living a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally, |10| since a human being is by nature political.⁶³ Of these, some defining mark must be found, since, if we extend the list to ancestors and descendants and to friends’ friends, it will go on without limit.⁶⁴ But we must investigate this on another occasion. In any case, we posit that what is self-sufficient is what, on its own, makes a life choiceworthy and lacking in nothing, and this, |15| we think, is what happiness is like.

Further, we think it is the most choiceworthy of all things, when not counted among them—for if it is counted among them, it clearly would be more choiceworthy with the addition of the least of goods. For what is added would bring about a superabundance of goods, and of goods, the greater one is always more choiceworthy.⁶⁵

Happiness, then, is apparently something complete and self-sufficient, [20] since it is the end of what is doable in action.

But to say that happiness is the best good is perhaps to say something that is apparently commonplace, and we still need a clearer statement of what it is. Maybe, then, this would come about if the function of a human being were grasped.⁶⁶ For just as for a flute player, a sculptor, [25] every craftsman, and in general for whatever has some function and action, the good—the doing well—seems to lie in the function, the same also seems to hold of a human being, if indeed there is some function that is his.

So are there some functions and actions of a carpenter and of a shoemaker but none at all of a human being? And is he by nature inactive? Or, rather, just as of eye, [30] hand, foot, and of each part generally there seems to be some function, may we likewise also posit some function of a human being that is beyond all these?⁶⁷

What, then, could this be? For living is evidently shared with plants as well, but we are looking for what is special.⁶⁸ Hence we must set aside the living that consists in nutrition and growth. Next in order [1098*1] is some sort of perceptual living.⁶⁹ But this too is evidently shared with horse and ox and every animal.

There remains, then, some sort of practical living of the part that has reason. And of what has reason, one part has it by dint of obeying reason, the other by dint of actually having it and exercising thought.⁷⁰ But “living” is said of things in two ways, [5] and we must take the one in accord with activity, since it seems to be called “living” in a fuller sense.⁷¹

If, then, the function of a human being is activity of the soul in accord with reason or not without reason, and the function of a sort of thing, we say, is the same in kind as the function of an excellent thing of that sort (as in the case of a lyre player and an excellent lyre player), and this is unconditionally so in all cases when we add to the function [10] the superiority that is in accord with the virtue (for it is characteristic of a lyre player to play the lyre and of an excellent one to do it well)—if all this is so, and a human being’s function is supposed to be a sort of living, and this living is supposed to be activity of the soul and actions that involve reason, and it is characteristic of an excellent man to do these well and nobly, and each is completed well when it is in accord with the virtue that properly belongs to it [15]—if all this is so, the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue and, if there are more virtues than one, then in accord with the best and most complete.⁷² Furthermore, in a complete life, for one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day.⁷³ Nor, similarly, does one day or a short time make someone blessed and happy.⁷⁴

Let the good, then, be sketched [20] in this way, since perhaps we should outline first and fill in the details later. It would seem, though, that anyone can develop and articulate the things in the outline that have been correctly done, and that time is a good discoverer and co-worker in such matters. This is even the source of advances in the crafts, since anyone can produce what is lacking.⁷⁵ [25]

We must also remember what was said before and not look for the same exactness in everything but, in each case, the one that is in accord with the subject matter and the degree sought by the method of inquiry that properly belongs to it.⁷⁶ For a carpenter and a geometer inquire differently about the right angle. A carpenter does so to the degree that is useful [30] for his work, whereas a geometer inquires about what it is or what sort of thing, since he is a contemplator of the truth.⁷⁷ We must do things in just the same way, then, in other cases, so that side issues do not overwhelm the works themselves.⁷⁸

Nor should we demand the cause in all cases alike.⁷⁹ Rather, in some cases it will be adequate [1098^b1] if the fact that they are so has been correctly shown—as it is indeed where starting-points are concerned.⁸⁰ And the fact that something is so is a first thing and a starting-point.⁸¹

We get a theoretical grasp of some starting-points through induction, some through perception, some through some sort of habituation, and others through other means.⁸² In each case we should follow the method of inquiry suited to their nature and make very serious efforts [5] to define them correctly. For they are of great and decisive importance regarding what follows. It seems indeed that the starting-point is more than half the whole and that many of the things we were inquiring about will at the same time become evident through it.

I 8

We must investigate it, however, not only in accord with the conclusions and premises of our argument but also in accord with the things we say [10] about it.⁸³ For all the data are in tune with a true view, whereas they soon clash with a false one.⁸⁴

Goods, then, have been divided into three sorts, with some said to be external, some relating to the soul, and some to the body.⁸⁵ The goods relating to soul are most fully such, and, we say, are goods to the highest degree, and we take the actions and activities of the [15] soul to be goods relating to soul.⁸⁶ So what we have said is correct, according to this view at least, which is long standing and agreed to by philosophers.⁸⁷

It is correct even in saying that actions and activities of some sort are the end, since that way the end turns out to be one of the goods relating to soul, and not one of the external ones.

The saying that someone who is happy [20] both lives well and does well is in tune with our argument too, since happiness has been pretty much defined as a sort of living well and doing well.

Again, all the things that are looked for where happiness is concerned apparently hold of what we have said it is. For to some it seems to be virtue, to others practical wisdom, to others some sort of theoretical wisdom, while to others it seems to be these or one of these involving pleasure or not without pleasure. [25] Other people include external prosperity as well. Some of these views are held by many and are long standing, while others are held by a few reputable men. And it is not reasonable to suppose that either group is entirely wrong but, rather, that they are right on one point at least or even on most of them.⁸⁸

Now with those who say that happiness is virtue or some sort of virtue, our argument is in tune, [30] since activity in accord with virtue is characteristic of that virtue.⁸⁹ But it makes no small difference, presumably, whether we suppose the best good to consist in virtue's possession or in its use—that is, in the state or in the activity.⁹⁰ For it is possible for someone to possess the state while accomplishing nothing good—for example, if he is sleeping [1099*1] or out of action in some other way. But the same will not hold of the activity, since he will necessarily be doing an action and doing it well. And just as in the Olympic Games it is not the noblest and strongest who get the victory crown but the competitors (since it is among these that the ones who win are found), so also [5] among the noble and good aspects of life it is those who act correctly who win the prizes.

Further, their life is intrinsically pleasant. For being pleased is among the things that belong to soul, and to each person what is pleasant is that thing by reference to which he is said to be a lover of such things—as, for example, a horse in the case of a lover of horses, and a play in that of a lover of plays. In the same way, just things [10] are pleasant to a lover of justice and the things in accord with virtue as a whole are pleasant to a lover of virtue.

The things that are pleasant to ordinary people, however, are in conflict because they are not naturally pleasant, whereas the things pleasant to lovers of what is noble are naturally pleasant. And actions in accord with virtue are like this, so that they are pleasant both to such people and intrinsically.

Their life, then, has no need of a pleasure that is superadded to it, [15] like some sort of appendage, but has its pleasure within itself. For besides what we have already said, the person who does not enjoy doing noble

actions is not good. For no one would call a person just who did not enjoy doing just actions, or generous if he did not enjoy doing generous ones, and similarly as regards the others. |20|

If that is so, however, actions in accord with virtue will be intrinsically pleasant. But they are also good, of course, and noble as well. Further, they are each of these things to the highest degree, if indeed an excellent person discerns them correctly—and he does discern them that way.⁹¹

Hence happiness is what is best, noblest, and most pleasant. And these qualities are not distinguished in the way |25| the Delian inscription says:

The noblest thing is the most just; the best, to be healthy.

The most pleasant, however, is to get the thing we desire.

For the best activities possess them all.⁹² And it is these—or the one among them that is best—that we say is happiness. |30|

All the same, it apparently needs external goods to be added, as we said, since it is impossible or not easy to do noble actions without supplies.⁹³ For just as we perform many actions by means of instruments, we perform many by means of friends, wealth, and political |1099^b1| power. Then again there are some whose deprivation disfigures blessedness, such as good breeding, good children, and noble looks.⁹⁴ For we scarcely have the stamp of happiness if we are extremely ugly in appearance, ill-bred, living a solitary life, or childless, and have it even less, presumably, if our children or friends are totally bad or |5| were good but have died.

Just as we said, then, happiness does seem to need this sort of prosperity to be added.⁹⁵ That is what leads some to identify good luck with happiness and others to identify virtue with happiness.⁹⁶

REQUIRED READING ENDS HERE

19

It is also what leads people to puzzle about whether happiness is something acquirable by learning or by habituation or by some other sort of training, or whether it comes about in accord with some divine dispensation or even by luck.⁹⁷ |10|

Well, if anything is a gift from the gods to human beings, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is also god given—especially since it is the best of human goods. Perhaps this topic properly belongs more to a different investigation, yet even if happiness is not a godsend but comes about through virtue and some sort of learning or |15| training, it is evidently one of the most divine things, since virtue's prize and end

is evidently something divine and blessed.⁹⁸ At the same time, it would also be something widely shared, since it is possible for it to be acquired through some sort of learning or supervision by all those not disabled in relation to virtue.⁹⁹

If it is better to acquire it in that way than to be happy by luck, [20] however, it is reasonable to suppose that this is how we do acquire it, if indeed what is in accord with nature is by nature in the noblest possible condition. Similarly with what is in accord with craft or with any cause whatsoever—above all, what is in accord with the best one. To entrust what is greatest and noblest to luck would strike a very false note.

The answer we are looking for is also entirely evident from our argument. [25] For we have said that happiness is a certain sort of activity of the soul in accord with virtue, while of the remaining goods, some are necessary conditions of it, others are by nature co-workers and useful as instruments. This also would agree with what we said at the start.¹⁰⁰ For we took the end of politics to be the best end. And its supervision aims above all at producing [30] citizens of a certain sort—that is, good people and doers of noble actions.¹⁰¹

It makes perfect sense, then, that we do not say that an ox, a horse, or any other animal whatsoever is happy, since none of them can share in this sort of activity. This is the [1100*1] explanation of why a child is not happy either, since he is not yet a doer of such actions because of his age. Children who are said to be blessed are being called blessed because of their prospects, since for happiness there must be, as we said, both complete virtue and a complete life.¹⁰² For many reversals of fortune [5] and all sorts of lucky accidents occur in life, and the most prosperous may meet with great disasters in old age—just as is said of Priam in the story of the events at Troy.¹⁰³ And no one counts someone happy who has suffered strokes of luck like that and dies in a wretched way.¹⁰⁴

I 10

Are we then to count no other human being happy either, [10] as long as he is still living but—in accord with Solon's advice—must we see the end?¹⁰⁵ And if we are indeed to accept his view, is it really that someone is happy only when he *is* dead? Or is that, at any rate, a completely strange notion—most of all for those who say, as we do, that happiness is a sort of activity?

Even if we do not say that the dead are happy, however—and this is not what Solon means either, [15] but only that when a human being has died it will at that point be safe to call him blessed (since he is then

outside the reach of bad things and misfortunes)—that is also something we might dispute to some extent. For to some extent it does seem that something may prove good or bad for someone who is dead, if indeed there are also good or bad things for someone who is living but not actively perceiving them—for example, honor and dishonor, and children [20] or descendants generally who do well or who suffer misfortunes.

But this also raises a puzzle. For it is possible for many reversals of fortune involving his descendants to befall someone who has lived a blessed life until old age and died accordingly. Some of his descendants may be good people and get the life they deserve while to others the contrary may happen. [25] And it is clear that the degree of separation between them and their ancestors admits of all sorts of variation. But it would be strange, surely, if the dead person changed along with them and was happy at one time and wretched at another. Yet it would also be strange if what happens to descendants did not affect their ancestors to any extent or for any period of time. [30]

But we should go back to the first puzzle. For maybe from it we will also be able to get a theoretical grasp on what we are now inquiring about. Suppose that we must wait to see the end in each case and at that point call someone blessed—not as then being blessed but because he was so before. Would it not be strange, then, if when he is happy, we cannot truly attribute to him what he actually possesses, because of our not [35] wishing to call the living happy because of reversals of fortune, [1100^b1] and because we suppose that happiness is something steadfast and in no way easy to reverse, whereas the same person's luck often turns completely around? For it is clear that if we were to be guided by luck, we would often have to say that the same person is happy and then wretched turn and turn about, [5] thereby representing the happy person as a sort of chameleon and as someone with unsound foundations.¹⁰⁶

Or is it that to be guided by luck is not at all correct? For it is not in *it* that living well and living badly are to be found but, rather, a human life needs this to be added, as we said, whereas it is activities in accord with virtue that control happiness and the [10] contrary ones its contrary.¹⁰⁷ The puzzle we are now going through further testifies to our argument for this. For none of the functions of human beings are as stable as those concerned with activities in accord with virtue, since they seem to be more steadfast even than our knowledge of the sciences. And of these sciences themselves, the most estimable are more steadfast, because the blessed [15] live most of all and most continuously in accord with them.¹⁰⁸ This would seem to be the cause, indeed, of why forgetfulness does not occur where they are concerned.¹⁰⁹

What we are inquiring about, then, will be characteristic of the happy person, and throughout life he will be as we say. For he will always or more than anyone else do actions and get a theoretical grasp on things in accord with virtue, and will bear what luck brings in the noblest way and, in every case, [20] in the most suitable one, since he is “good, four-square, beyond blame.”¹¹⁰

Many things happen in accord with luck, however, that differ in greatness and smallness. But small strokes of good luck or similarly of the opposite clearly will not have a strong influence on his way of living, whereas great and repeated ones, when [25] good, will make his life more blessed, since by nature they help to adorn it, and his use of them is noble and excellent. If they turn out the reverse, though, they reduce or spoil his blessedness, since they involve pain and impede many activities. All the same, even in these cases nobility shines through [30] when someone calmly bears repeated strokes of great bad luck—not because he is insensitive to suffering but because of being well bred and great-souled.

If, however, it is activities that control living, as we said, no blessed person will ever become wretched, since he will never do hateful or base actions.¹¹¹ For a truly [35] good and practically-wise person, we think, will bear what luck brings graciously [1101•1] and, making use of the resources at hand, will always do the noblest actions, just as a good general makes the best uses in warfare of the army he has and a good shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides he has been given, and the same way [5] with all other craftsmen.

If this is so, however, a happy person will never become wretched—nor *blessed* certainly—if he runs up against luck like Priam’s. He will not, then, be variable or easily subject to reversals of fortune, since he will not be easily shaken from his happiness by just any misfortunes¹¹² that chance to come along but only by great [10] and repeated ones. And from these he will not return to being happy again in a short time but—if indeed he does do so—in a long and complete one in which he achieves great and noble things.

What, then, prevents us from calling happy the person who is active in accord with complete virtue and is adequately supplied with external goods [15] not for some random period of time but in a complete life? Or must we add that he will continue living like that and will die accordingly, since the future is obscure to us and we suppose happiness to be an end and complete in every way? If so, we shall call “blessed” those living people who have and will continue to have the things we mentioned—blessed, [20] though, in the way human beings are.¹¹³

So much for our determinations on these topics.

I 11

The view that the luck of someone's descendants and all his friends have not the slightest effect on him is evidently a view too inimical to friendship and one that is contrary to the beliefs held on the subject.¹¹⁴ But since the things that happen are many and admit of all sorts of differences, and some of them get through to us more and |25| others less, it is evidently a long—even endless—task to distinguish all the particular cases, and it will perhaps be enough to speak about the matter in universal terms and in outline.

If, then, of even the misfortunes that affect the person himself, some have a certain weight and a strong influence as regards his life, whereas others seem to have a lighter one, the same also holds for what affects all his friends. |30| And for each incident, it makes a difference whether it involves the living or the dead—much more than whether the unlawful and terrible deeds in tragedies have happened beforehand or are enacted on the stage.

Our deductive argument, then, must also take account of this difference, but even more account, perhaps, of the results of going through the puzzles about whether the dead share in any good thing |35| or in any of the opposite ones.¹¹⁵ For it seems likely from these considerations that even if |1101^b1| anything at all does get through to them, whether good or the opposite, it is something feeble and small, either unconditionally so or so for them. Or if it is not like that, it is of a size and sort, at any rate, that does not make happy those who are not happy or take away the blessedness of those who are. It does, then, contribute |5| something to the dead, apparently, when their friends do well and similarly when they do badly, but something of such a sort and size that it neither makes the happy ones unhappy nor does anything else of this sort.

I 12

Having made these determinations, let us investigate whether happiness |10| is included among praiseworthy things or, rather, among estimable ones, since it is clear at least that it is not included among capacities.¹¹⁶

Well, apparently all the things that are praiseworthy are praised for being of a certain quality and for standing in a certain relation to something. For we praise the just person and the courageous one—in fact, the good person and his virtue generally—because of his actions and his |15| works, also the strong person and the good runner, and so on in

each of the other cases, because he is naturally of a certain quality and stands in a certain relation to something good or excellent.¹¹⁷ This is also clear from awards of praise involving the gods. For these are evidently ridiculous if it is by reference to us that they are awarded. But this happens because awards of praise involve [20] such a reference, as we just said.¹¹⁸

If praise is of things like this, it is clear that of the best things there is no praise but something greater and better—as is in fact evident. For we call the gods both blessed and happy and call the most divine of men this as well. Similarly in the case of goods too. For we never [25] praise happiness as we praise justice, but call it blessed since it is a more divine and better thing.¹¹⁹

It seems, in fact, that Eudoxus advocated in the correct way the cause of pleasure in the competition for supreme excellence.¹²⁰ For not to praise pleasure, while including it among the goods, is to reveal, he thought, that it is better than things that are praised, in the way that the god and the good are, [30] since it is to these that the others are referred.¹²¹

For praise is properly given to virtue, since we are doers of noble actions as a result of it, whereas encomia are properly given to its works, in like manner both to those of the body and those of the soul.¹²² But perhaps an exact treatment of these topics more properly belongs to those who work on encomia. It is clear to us from what [35] we have said, however, that happiness is included among things both estimable and complete. [1102^a1]

This also seems to hold because happiness is a starting-point, since it is for the sake of it that we all do all the other actions that we do, and we suppose that the starting-point and cause of what is good is something estimable and divine.¹²³

I 13

Since happiness is some activity of the soul in accord with [5] complete virtue, we must investigate virtue, since maybe that way we will also get a better theoretical grasp on happiness. It seems too that someone who is truly a politician will have worked most on virtue, since he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws.¹²⁴ A paradigm case is provided by the Cretan [10] and Spartan legislators and by any others there may have been that are like them.¹²⁵ If this investigation belongs to politics, however, it is clear that our present inquiry will be in accord with the deliberate choice we made at the start.¹²⁶

It is also clear that the virtue we must investigate is human virtue. For it is in fact the human good we are looking for, and human happiness. [15] By “human virtue,” though, we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness, we say, is an activity of the soul. But if all this is so, it is clear that a politician must in a way know about what pertains to the soul, just as someone who is going to take care of people’s eyes must know about the body generally—more so, indeed, to the extent that politics is more estimable [20] and better than medicine—and that doctors (the ones who are more sophisticated) occupy themselves greatly with knowing about the body.¹²⁷ It is also for a politician, then, to get a theoretical grasp on what concerns the soul. But his theoretical grasp should be for the sake of the things in question and of an extent that is adequate to the things being looked for, since a more exact treatment is perhaps harder work than [25] the topics before us require.

Enough has been said about some aspects of the soul in the external accounts too, and we should make use of these—for example, that one part of the soul is nonrational whereas another part has reason.¹²⁸ Whether these are distinguished like the parts of the body or like anything else that is divisible or whether they are two in definition but inseparable by nature (like [30] convex and concave in a curved surface) makes no difference for present purposes.¹²⁹

Of the nonrational part, one part seems to be shared and vegetative—I mean, the cause of nutrition and growth. For this sort of capacity of soul is one that we suppose is present in all things that take in nourishment, even embryos, and that this same one [1102^b1] is also present in completely grown animals, since that is more reasonable than to suppose a different one to be present in them.

Hence the virtue of this capacity is apparently something shared and not distinctively human. For this part and this capacity seem to be most active in sleep, and a good person and a bad one are least clearly distinguished during [5] sleep (leading people to say that the happy are no different from the wretched for half their lives, which makes perfect sense, since sleep is idleness of the soul in that respect with reference to which it is said to be excellent or base), unless—to some small extent—some movements do get through to us and, in this way, the things that appear in the dreams of decent people are better than those of any [10] random person.¹³⁰ But that is enough about these things, and we should leave the nutritive part aside, since by nature it has no share in human virtue.¹³¹

Another natural constituent of the soul, however, also seems to be nonrational, although it shares in reason in a way. For we praise the reason—that is, the part of the soul that has reason—of a person with

self-control and of a person without it, since |15| it exhorts them correctly toward what is best. But they also have by nature something else within them besides reason, apparently, which fights against reason and resists it. For exactly as with paralyzed limbs (when their owners deliberately choose to move them to the right, they do the contrary and move off to the left), so it is in the case of the soul as well, |20| since the impulses of people who lack self-control are in contrary directions. In the case of the body, to be sure, we see the part that is moving in the wrong direction, whereas in the case of the soul we do not see it. But presumably we should nonetheless acknowledge that in the soul as well there is something besides reason, countering it and going against it. How it is different, though, is not important.

But this part |25| apparently also has a share of reason, as we said, at any rate, it is obedient to the reason of a self-controlled person.¹³² Furthermore, that of a temperate and courageous person, presumably, listens still better, since there it chimes with reason in everything.

Apparently, then, the nonrational part is also twofold, since the vegetative part does not share in reason in any way but the appetitive part (indeed, the desiring part as a whole) does so |30| in some way, because it is able to listen to reason and obey it.¹³³ It has reason, then, in the way we are said to have the reason of our fathers and friends and not in the way we are said to have that of mathematics.¹³⁴ The fact, though, that the nonrational part is persuaded in some way by reason is revealed by the practice of warning people and of all the different practices of admonishing and exhorting them.

If we should say that it too has reason, |1103*1| however, then the part that has reason will be double as well—one part having it fully and within itself, the other as something able to listen to it as to a father.

Virtues are also defined in accord with this difference, since we say that some are of thought, others of character. Theoretical wisdom, comprehension, |5| and practical wisdom are virtues of thought; generosity and temperance virtues of character.¹³⁵ For when we talk about someone's character we do not say that he is theoretically-wise or has comprehension but that he is mild-mannered or temperate. But we do also praise a theoretically-wise person with reference to his state, and—among the states—it is the praiseworthy ones that we call virtues. |10|

Notes

The rest of this document is just notes, and these are purely optional

BOOK I

Note 1

Craft: Discussed at VI 4. **Method of inquiry** (*methodos*): A *methodos* is a *tropos tēs zētēseōs*—a way of inquiry (*APo.* I 31 46^a32–^b36). *Hodos* means “route” or “road,” as at *NE* I 4 1095^a33. **Action** (*praxis*): The noun *praxis* (verb: *prattein*) is used in a broad sense to refer to any intentional action, including one performed by a child or wild beast (*III* 1 1111^a25–26, 2 1111^b8–9), and in a narrower one to refer exclusively to what results from deliberation (*bouleusis*) and deliberate choice (*prohairesis*), of which neither wild beasts nor children are capable (*I* 9 1099^b32–1100^a5, *EE* II 8 1224^a28–29). The narrower sense may be the one intended here. **Deliberate choice:** Discussed in *III* 2.

Note 2

That is why they correctly declare: Aristotle apparently commits the logical fallacy of inferring from the fact that there is a good that each seeks that there is a good that all (that is, all who practice crafts, follow lines in inquiry, do actions, and make deliberate choices) seek. This is like inferring from the fact that each boy loves a girl (but not necessarily the same one) that there is a girl all boys love. *I* 2 1094^a18–^b7 suggests a way to defend the inference. Any good or end is sought or desired either because of itself or because of something else. Eventually this chain of “because” must terminate in an end or good X that is desired solely because of itself. If all such chains terminate in the same X, as the existence of an architectonic science with an end or good that circumscribes all the others suggests, then X will be the human good—that is, the one unique good that all human beings, in seeking any good whatsoever, thereby seek. **Correctly** (*kalōs*): *Kalōs*, the adverb derived from the adjective *kalos* (“noble”), sometimes means “nobly” and sometimes, as here, means something closer to “rightly” or “correctly.” **The good is “that which all (*panta*) seek”:** One of the generally accepted accounts of the good canvassed at *Rh.* I 6 1362^a23–29 and treated as uncontroversial at *NE* X 2 1172^b35–1173^a6. It is attributed to Eudoxus (who may be one of “they” referred to) at X 2 1172^b9–10, where *panta* clearly means not “all things” but all animals, whether rational or nonrational.

Note 3

Appears (*phainetai*): The verb *phainesthai* (“appear”) with (1) a participle is endorsing of what appears to be so and is translated “it is evident,” and

the cognate adjective *phaneron* is translated as “evident.” *Phainesthai* with (2) an infinitive is neither endorsing nor rejecting of what appears to be so and is translated “appears.” When *phainesthai* occurs without a participle or an infinitive, it may be endorsing or rejecting. Appearances (*phainomena*) are things that appear to be so but that may or may not be so. Things that appear so to everyone or to wise people who have investigated them are *endoxa*, or reputable beliefs. The role of both *phainomena* and *endoxa* in ethics are discussed at VII 1 1145^b2–7. **Ends:** “The end (*telos*) is the best and last thing for whose sake all the other things are done” (*EE* II 1 1219^a10–11; *Met.* V 16 1021^b29–30).

Note 4

Activities: The actualization (*entelecheia*) or use (*chrêsis*) of a capacity (*dunamis*) or state (*hexis*), as when an agent is currently engaging in deliberately chosen action, is an activity (*energeia*), by contrast with a process or movement (*kinêsis*). This contrast is employed in *NE* X 4. When the activity is something’s function—as deliberately chosen action is (part of) a human being’s function—then “the function is the end (*telos*), and the activity is the function” (*Met.* IX 8 1050^a21–22). A second sort of end is one that is the further end of an activity of this first sort. Thus functions are also of two sorts: “It is clear that the function is better than the state or the disposition (*diathesis*); but ‘function’ is said of things in two ways. In some cases, the function is a different thing beyond the use (*chrêsis*), as a house is the function of building and not the activity of building, and health is the function of medicine and not the activity of producing health or practicing medicine. In other cases, the use is the function, as seeing is the function of sight, and active contemplation (*theôria*) is the function of the scientific knowledge of mathematics. Hence it necessarily follows that when the use of a thing is its function, the use is better than the state” (*EE* II 1 1219^a11–18). So just as the house is better than the activity of building, so the actualization or use of a state or of a capacity is better than the state or capacity itself (*NE* I 1 1094^a16–18). Although one kind of further end is a product or work, such as a house or health, another can be a state. Thus the actualization of practical wisdom, which is a state of the soul, is a valuable end, choiceworthy because of itself but also choiceworthy for the sake of theoretical wisdom and its actualization (VI 13 1145^a6–11, X 7 1177^b4–26). Correlated with this difference is one in the states themselves. The actualization or use of a *productive* state or capacity, such as building, is an incomplete activity, since it is not itself an end, whereas that of other sorts of states, such as scientific knowledge, is a complete activity, since it is an end (*Met.* IX 6 1048^b18–35). Productive states are discussed in *NE* VI 4, where they are contrasted with practical or action-related ones. **Works** (*erga*: singular, *ergon*): Aristotle uses the noun *ergon* for (1) the function or activity that is the actualization or use of a state, such as the knowledge of the craft of medicine, and for (2) works (which may or may not be products in the strict sense of the term) that are the further results of that activity.

Note 5

Sciences (*epistêmai*: singular, *epistêmê*): Aristotle usually divides sciences into three kinds: theoretical (contemplative), practical (action-determining), and productive (crafts) (*Top.* VI 6 145^a15–16, *Met.* XI 7 1064^a16–19). Sometimes a more fine-grained classification is employed, in which theoretical sciences are divided into natural sciences (such as physics and biology) and strictly theoretical sciences (such as astronomy and theology) on the basis of the kinds of beings with which they deal (*Ph.* II 7 198^a21–^b4, *Met.* VI 1 1025^b18–1026^a32). In *NE*, the term *epistêmê* is sometimes reserved for the unconditional scientific knowledge provided exclusively by the strictly theoretical sciences (VI 3 1139^b31–34), but here, as often elsewhere, *epistêmê* is used in the looser sense, which encompasses the natural, practical, and productive sciences as well.

Medicine . . . shipbuilding . . . generalship . . . household management: The names of these crafts or sciences are: *iatrikê* (“medicine”), *naupégikê* (“shipbuilding”), *stratégikê* (“generalship”), and *oikonomikê* (“household management”). The ending *-ikê* signifies that either *epistêmê* (“science”) or *technê* (“craft”) should be supplied or presupposed, so that *iatrikê* is “the science of medicine,” and *naupégikê* is “the craft of shipbuilding.” Since a craft is a productive science, it usually doesn’t matter much which we choose.

Note 6

Capacity (*dunamis*): The term *dunamis* (plural: *dunameis*) is used by Aristotle to capture two different but related things. (1) As in ordinary Greek, it signifies a power or capacity something has, especially one to cause movement in something else (productive *dunamis*) or to be caused to move by something else (passive *dunamis*). (2) It signifies a way of being F, being capable of being F (or being F in potentiality) as distinguished from being actively F (or F in actuality) (see IX 7 1168^a5–15). Here the use of the term indicates that Aristotle is thinking of the crafts and sciences in his usual way, as psychological capacities or states of the soul, not as abstract structures of propositions or sentences of the sort found in textbooks (see VI 3 1139^b15–18, X 9 1181^b2). **And, in the same way:** Reading δὲ for OCT δῆ (“in the same way, then”).

Note 7

But in all such cases: Reading δὲ for OCT δῆ (“in all such cases, then”).

The architectonic ones: “In each craft, the architectonic craftsmen are more estimable, know more, and are wiser than the handicraftsmen, because they know the causes of their products” (*Met.* I 1 981^a30–^b1).

Note 8

The sciences we have mentioned: Suppose that the end of someone’s action is to do well in action (VI 2 1139^b1–4), and that doing well in action consists in actualizing or using his virtuous state of character, then the end of his action will be the activity consisting in the actualization of that state.

Because the sciences mentioned have ends beyond their actualization or use, they are not like this.

Note 9

If, then, there is some end that we wish for because of itself, and the others because of it, . . . this will be the good—that is, the best good: “Since the for-the-sake-of-which is an end, and the sort of end that is not for the sake of other things but rather other things are for its sake, it follows that if there is to be a last thing of this sort, the series will not be without a limit, but if there is no such thing, there will be no for-the-sake-of-which. Those who make it unlimited are unwittingly getting rid of the nature of the good (and yet no one would try to do anything if he were not going to come to a limit). Nor would there be any understanding present in beings. For a person who has understanding, at any rate, always does the actions he does for the sake of something, and this is a limit, since the end is a limit” (*Met.* II 2 994^b9–16). **Doable in action** (*prakton*): Verbals ending in *-ton*—of which *prakton* is an example—sometimes have (1) the meaning of a perfect passive participle (“done in action”) and sometimes (2) express possibility (“doable in action”). A decree (*psêphisma*) seems to be *prakton* in sense (2), since it is a prescription specific enough to be acted on without further need for deliberation (VI 8 1141^b23–28). What it specifies is thus a possibility (a type of action) that many different particular (token) actions might actualize. Particular objects of perception that are *prakton* (VI 11 1143^a32–33, ^b4–5) seem to be so in sense (1). **Wish:** Discussed in III 4. **The desire will be empty and pointless:** Like their English counterparts “empty” and “pointless,” *kenos* and *mataios* are somewhat vague. The primary meaning of *kenos* is “being like an empty cup or vessel.” In Plato, as elsewhere, it is thus readily applied to desires: “hunger, thirst, and the like are some sort of emptiness related to the state of the body” (*Rep.* IX 585a–b). Presumably, then, a *kenos* desire is one that, as (always) empty, cannot be satisfied. This does not mean that a desire cannot be *kenos*, but when it is, a question naturally arises about the rationality of acting on it. It is this fact that lays the ground for *mataios*, the primary connotation of which is “foolish or without reason” or “pointless.” Thus it is *mataios* for a young person to study a practical science like ethics or politics, since he tends to follow his feelings, not what he will learn by studying it (*NE* I 4 1095^a5).

Note 10

Our life (*bios*): Two Greek words correspond to the English word “life”: *bios*, used here, and *zôê*, used extensively in I 7 and translated “living.” *Zôê* refers to the sorts of life processes and activities studied by biologists, zoologists, and so on, such as growth, reproduction, perception, and understanding. *Bios* refers to the sort of life a natural historian or biographer might investigate—the life of the otter, the life of Pericles—and so to a span of time throughout which someone possesses *zôê* at least as a capacity

(I 13 1102^b5–7). Hence, in the conclusion of the function argument, we are reminded that a certain *zôê* will not be happiness for a human being unless it occurs “in a complete *bios*” (I 7 1098^a18–20). **Knowledge** (*gnôsis*; verb, *gignôskein*): Although there may be little difference between *gnôsis* and *epistêmê* (verb, *epistasthai*), *epistêmê* is usually applied only to demonstrative sciences, crafts, or other bodies of systematic knowledge, so that *epistêmê* is specifically *scientific* knowledge. *Gnôsis* is weaker and is used for perceptual knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance—something familiar is *gnôrimos*. If X knows that *p*, it follows that *p* is true and that X is justified in believing it. Similar entailments hold in the cases of *epistasthai* and *eidenai* but may not hold in that of *gignôskein*. **Target** (*skopos*): The notion of a *skopos*, which belongs primarily to archery, is used metaphorically to refer to an end, particularly one pursued in deliberate action (*EE* I 2 1214^b6–9, II 10 1227^a5–7, *Pol.* VII 13 1331^b6–8, *Rh.* I 6 1362^a15–20).

Note 11

Outline: Sometimes when Aristotle gives an outline, it means that a fuller account may be forthcoming, so that the outline is merely provisional (II 7 1107^b14–16). When things in a given area hold for the most part, however, it seems that the truth about them *must* be stated in outline (II 2 1104^a1–5). In this case, having to outline seems to be a function of the subject matter, so that it is because we are discussing things that hold for the most part in ethics and politics that these sciences involve outlining. Far from being a correctable flaw in such sciences, this seems to be an indication of their intellectual probity. **We should try to grasp . . . what the good is:** “Everyone who can live in accord with his own deliberate choice should adopt some target for the noble life, whether honor, reputation, wealth, or education, which he will look to in all his actions—at any rate, not to have ordered one’s life in relation to some end is the sign of great foolishness. Most of all, though, and before everything else, he should define for himself in which of our possessions living well consists and what those things are without which it cannot belong to human beings” (*EE* I 2 1214^b6–14). **Sciences or capacities:** Often sciences and capacities are lumped together as things that can be used to achieve opposite effects, as medicine can be used to cure but also to kill (V I 1129^a13–14). Sometimes, though, a body of knowledge (such as rhetoric or dialectic) is classified as a capacity (*dunamis*) rather than a science, because its subject matter lacks the requisite sort of unity: “Rhetoric is constituted from the science of the *Analytics* [= logic and scientific explanation] and from the part of politics dealing with character [= ethics], resembling dialectic on the one hand, sophistical arguments on the other. But to the extent that someone tries to set out dialectic and rhetoric not as *dunamis* but as sciences, he unwittingly obscures their nature by the change, setting them down as sciences dealing with specific subject matters, rather than with arguments alone” (*Rh.* I 4 1359^b9–16).

Note 12

Control (*kurios*): Control is fundamentally executive power or authority or the power to compel, so that a general is *kurios* over his army (III 8 1116^a29–b2) and a political ruler is *kurios* over a city and its inhabitants. Since what is *kurios* in a sphere determines or partly determines what happens within it, it is one of the most estimable or important elements in the sphere, so that what is inferior or less important than something cannot control it (VI 12 1143^b33–35, 13 1145^a6–7). When Aristotle contrasts natural virtue of character with the *kurios* variety (VI 13 1144^b1–32), the control exerted by the latter seems to be teleological: the natural variety is a sort of virtue because it is an early stage in the development of mature virtue (compare *Met.* IX 8 1050^a21–23). Hence *kuria aretê* is “full virtue” or virtue in the full sense of the term. It is in this sense that the life of those who are active and awake is a more *kurios* life—life in a fuller sense—than that of the inactive or asleep (*NE* I 7 1098^a5–8).

Note 13

Politics (*politikê*): *Politikê* is the practical science used in ruling a city (I 9 1099^b29–32, 13 1102^a18–25, II 1 1103^b3–6, VI 8 1141^b23–33, VII 11 1152^b1–3, X 9 1180^b23–1181^b23). Someone who knows *politikê* is a true *politikos*—a true politician or true statesman. **City** (*polis*): A *polis* is a unique political organization, something like a city and something like a state. Unlike a typical modern city, a *polis* enjoyed the political sovereignty characteristic of a modern state: it could possess its own army and navy, enter into alliances, make war, and so on. Unlike a typical modern state, however, it was a politically, religiously, and culturally unified community, and quite small scale. The territory of a *polis* included a single (typically) walled town (*astu*) with a citadel and a marketplace, which, as the political and governmental heart of *polis*, is itself often referred to as the *polis*. But a *polis* also included the surrounding agricultural land, and the citizens lived both there and inside the town proper.

Note 14

Rhetoric: “Let rhetoric be [defined as] the capacity of getting a theoretical grasp on the available means of persuasion in any given case” (*Rh.* I 2 1355^b25–26).

Note 15

The other practical sciences: Reading ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς. OCT omits πρακτικαῖς (“practical”). **Circumscribe** (*periechoi*): The primary connotation of *periechein* (here “circumscribe”), which is a compound of the preposition *peri* (“around”) and the verb *echein* (“have,” “possess”), is that of containing by surrounding. So if that were its meaning here, the human good would have to contain all the other goods subordinate to it. Yet generalship’s end—victory—does not seem to contain either trained horses or their bridles, any more than health, which is medicine’s end and a certain bodily condition, contains medical instruments, medical

treatment, or drugs. Just as “contain” can also mean “circumscribe” or “limit,” however, so too can *periechein*. The idea would then be that the end of politics *limits* or circumscribes the ends of all the relevant sciences, including those of the other practical sciences and actions. By looking to its own end, politics sets limits as to which sciences should be in cities, which groups should practice them and to what degree, and what actions should be done and what avoided. Why a limiting end of this sort would have to be the best or human good would remain unclear. Other people’s rights, for example, may set absolute limits to our pursuit of happiness and so be limiting ends. But it is not obvious that respecting the rights of others is the *best* good. In addition, whatever imposes the limit should itself be an end that all other ends further, so that this end is a better good than the other ones. This end, in other words, would have to be the common end of all of them—an idea implicit in the use of *periechein* at V I 1129^b10–11. **Human** (*anthrôpinon*): An *anthrôpos* is a human being of either sex; an *anêr* is a male human being—a man. The adjective *anthrôpinos* (“human”) often seems to mean something like “merely human” (for example, X 7 1177^b32). *Anthrôpikos* (also “human”) sometimes has similar connotations (for example, X 8 1178^a10). Indeed, *anthrôpos* itself is sometimes used to refer to the whole human animal, sometimes to the human element in human beings by contrast with the divine one (their understanding) (X 7 1177^b27–28), and sometimes to that divine element, since it is what makes human beings distinctively human (X 5 1176^a25–29). **It will be the human good:** “Since the end in every science and craft is a good, the greatest and best good is the end of the science or craft that has most control of all of them, and this is the political capacity (*politikê dunamis*). But the political good is justice, and justice is the common advantage” (*Pol.* III 12 1282^b14–18); “First, then, we must see that every science and capacity has some end, and it is something good. For no science or capacity exists for the sake of a bad end. So if of every capacity the end is something good, it is clear the end of the best one will be the best good. But the political capacity is the best one, so its end will be the best good. Hence it is about the good, it seems, that we must speak and not an unconditional one but about the good for us and not about the good for the gods” (*MM* I 1 1182^a32–^b4). In the *Metaphysics* a parallel argument is used to show that theoretical wisdom (*sophia*) “knows the end for which each thing should be done, and this is the good characteristic of each of them and, in general, the best good in all of nature” (I 2 982^b4–7).

Note 16

If the good is the same for an individual and for a city: “It is evident that the same life is necessarily best both for each human being individually and for cities and human beings collectively” (*Pol.* VII 3 1325^b30–32). **More complete:** The relative completeness of goods is discussed at I 7 1097^a30–34.

Note 17

A sort of politics: Specifically it is “the part of politics dealing with character (*ta êthê*)” (*Rh.* I 4 1359^b10–11), so that *NE*, as a contribution to virtue and to politics (II 4 1105^a11–12), is included in what Aristotle refers to as “those philosophical works of ours in which we draw distinctions concerning matters of character (*tôn êthikôn*)” (*Pol.* III 12 1282^b20) and as “our ethical works (*tous êthikous logous*)” (VII 13 1332^a22).

Note 18

Degree of perspicuity (*diasaphêtheiê*): *Saphêneia* is associated with explanation, which is ultimately from starting-points: “Beginning with things that are truly stated but not perspicuously, we proceed to make them perspicuous as well. . . . That is why even politicians should not regard as peripheral to their work the sort of theoretical knowledge that makes evident (*phaneron*) not only the fact that but also the explanation why” (*EE* I 6 1216^b32–39). The same point is made at *NE* I 7 1098^b7–8 by noting that when we have a correct definition of the starting-point of politics much else will “at the same time become evident (*sumphanê*) through it.” *Saphês* and *akribês* (“exact”) are often equivalent in meaning: “it is well to replace a word with a better known equivalent, for example, instead of *akribês* in describing a supposition, *saphês*” (*Top.* II 4 111^a8–9).

Note 19

Exactness (*akribes*): “One science is more exact than another, and prior to it, if it is both of the fact and the explanation why, and not of the fact separately from giving the scientific knowledge of the explanation why; or if it is not said of an underlying subject and the other is said of an underlying subject (as, for example, arithmetic is more exact than harmonics); or if it proceeds from fewer things and the other from some additional posit (as, for example, arithmetic is more exact than geometry). By from an additional posit I mean, for example, that a unit is a substance without position and a point is a substance with position—the latter proceeds from an additional posit” (*APo.* I 27 87^a31–37); “we should not demand the argumentative exactness of mathematics in all cases but only in the case of things that involve no matter” (*Met.* II 3 995^a14–16). As applied to craftsmen and their products, on the other hand, *akribês* means “refinement,” “finish,” or “sophistication.” Applied to perceptual capacities, such as seeing or smelling (*DA* II 9 421^a10), it means “discriminating.” Applied to virtue and nature, it may have more to do with accuracy—hitting a target (*NE* II 5 1106^b14–15)—as it may when applied to definitions (VIII 7 1159^a3) or distinctions (II 9 1107^b15–16) or units of measurement (*Met.* X 1 1053^a1). **In all accounts** (*logois*): *Logos* (here “account”) can refer among other things (1) to a word or organized string of words constituting a discussion, conversation, speech, explanation, definition, principle, reason, or piece of reasoning, or (2) to what such words or their utterances mean, express, or denote, such as, the ratio between quantities (V 3 1131^a31–32), or (3) to

the capacity that enables someone to argue, give reasons, and so on (*Pol.* VII 13 1332^b5).

Note 20

Noble (*kalos*): The adjective *kalos* is often a term of vague or general commendation (“fine,” “beautiful,” “good”), with different connotations in different contexts: “The contrary of *to kalon* when applied to an animal is *to aischron* [“ugly in appearance”], but when applied to a house it is *to mochthêron* [“wretched”], and so *kalon* is homonymous” (*Top.* I 15 106^a20–22). (1) Even in this general sense, however, *kalos* has a distinctive evaluative coloration suggestive of “order (*taxis*), proportion (*summetria*), and determinateness (*hôrismenon*)” (*Met.* XIII 3 1078^a36–^b1), making a term with aesthetic connotation, such as “beauty,” seem a good equivalent: to bear the stamp of happiness one must have *kallos* as opposed to being “very ugly (*panaischês*)” (*NE* I 8 1099^b3–4; also *Pol.* V 9 1309^b23–25). Moreover just as a thing need not have a purpose in order to be beautiful, a *kalon* thing can be contrasted with a purposeful one: a great-souled person is one “whose possession are more *kalon* and purposeless (*akarpa*) than purposeful and beneficial” (*NE* IV 3 1125^a11–12). At the same time, it seems wrong to associate *kalon* with beauty in general, since to be *kalon* a thing has to be on a certain scale: “greatness of soul requires magnitude, just as *to kallos* (‘nobility of appearance’) requires a large body, whereas small people are elegant and well proportioned but not *kaloi*” (IV 3 1123^b6–8); “any *kalon* object . . . made up of parts must not only have them properly ordered but also have a magnitude which is not random. For what is *kalon* consists in magnitude and order (*taxis*)” (*Po.* 7 1450^b34–37; also *Pol.* VII 4 1326^b33–34). It is this requirement that makes “nobility” in its more aesthetic sense a closer equivalent than “beauty.” (2) In ethical or political contexts, the canonical application of *kalon* is to ends that are intrinsically choiceworthy and intrinsically commendable or praiseworthy (*epaineton*): “Of all goods, the ends are those choiceworthy for their own sake. Of these, in turn, the *kalon* ones are all those praiseworthy because of themselves” (*EE* VIII 3 1248^b18–20; also *NE* I 13 1103^a9–10). It is because ethically *kalon* actions are intrinsically choiceworthy ends that a good person can do virtuous actions because of themselves (*NE* II 4 1105^a32) and for the sake of what is *kalon* (III 7 1115^b12–13). What makes such actions choiceworthy (VI 1 1138^a18–20) and praiseworthy (II 6 1106^b24–27), however, is that they exhibit the sort of order (X 9 1180^a14–18), proportionality (II 2 1104^a18), and determinateness (II 6 1106^b29–30, IX 9 1170^a19–24) that consists in lying in a mean (*meson*) between two extremes. This brings us full circle, connecting what is ethically *kalon* to what is aesthetically noble, lending the former too an aesthetic tinge. Finally, what is ethically *kalon* includes an element of self-sacrifice that recommends “nobility,” in its more ethical sense, as a good equivalent for it as well: “It is true of an excellent person too that he does many actions for the sake of his friends and his fatherland, even dying for them if need be. For he will give up wealth,

honors, and fought-about goods generally, in keeping for himself what is *kalon*” (IX 8 1169^a18–22). One reason people praise a *kalon* agent, indeed, is that his actions benefit them: “The greatest virtues must be those that are most useful to others, and because of this, just people and courageous ones are honored most of all; for courage is useful to others in war, justice both in war and peace” (*Rh.* I 9 1366^b3–7). But since what is *kalon* is a greater good than those an excellent person gives up or confers on others, there is also a strong element of self-interest in what he does: “The greater good, then, he allocates to himself” (*NE* IX 8 1169^a28–29). An excellent person does *kalon* actions for their own sake, not for an ulterior motive, because it is only as done in that way that they constitute the doing well in action (*eupraxia*) that is happiness. **By nature:** See V 7 1134^b18–35.

Note 21

For the most part: The fact that things in a given area of study hold for the most part does not preclude there being a demonstrative science of them (*APr.* I 13 32^b18–22, *APo.* I 30 87^b19–27, *Met.* VI 2 1027^a19–21). Theorems of natural sciences hold for the most part (*APr.* I 13 32^b4–8), as do those of ethics or politics (*NE* V 10 1137^b13–19, IX 2 1164^b31–33). Only strictly theoretical sciences, such as mathematics, astronomy, and theology, have theorems that hold universally and with unconditional necessity (VI 3 1139^b18–24).

Note 22

Well-educated person: “Regarding every branch of theoretical knowledge and every method of inquiry, the more humble and more estimable alike, there appear to be two ways for the state to be—one that may be well described as scientific knowledge of the subject matter, the other a certain sort of educatedness. For it is characteristic of a person well educated in that way to be able accurately to discern what is well said and what is not. We think of someone who is well educated about the whole of things as a person of that sort, and we think that being well educated consists in having the capacity to do that sort of discerning. But in one case we consider a single individual to have the capacity to discern in practically all subjects, in the other case we consider him to have the capacity to discern in a subject of a delimited nature—for there might be a person with the same capacity as the person we have been discussing but about a part of the whole. So it is clear in the case of inquiry into nature too that there should be certain defining marks by reference to which one can appraise the manner of its demonstrations, apart from the question of what the truth is, whether thus or otherwise” (*PA* I 1 639^a1–15); “The term ‘doctor’ applies both to a producer of health and to an architectonic craftsman and thirdly to someone well educated in the craft. For there are people of this third sort in practically speaking all the crafts. And we assign the task of discerning to well-educated people no less than to experts” (*Pol.* III 11 1282^a3–7); “Because it seems to them characteristic of a philosopher not

to speak baselessly but always in a way that involves reason, some people often unwittingly formulate reasons that are foreign to the subject and so, pointless (sometimes they do this because of ignorance, sometimes because they are boasters). By means of such reasons even people of experience and capable of doing things in action can be caught out by those with no capacity for architectonic or practical thinking. This happens to them because of their not being well educated, since not being well educated is precisely the inability to discern in each subject which arguments belong to it and which are foreign to it” (*EE* I 6 1216^b40–1217^a10); “Some people want everything expressed exactly, whereas others are annoyed by what is exact, either because they cannot string all the bits together or because they regard it as nitpicking. For exactness does have something of this quality, so that just as in business transactions so too in arguments it seems to have something unfree or ungenerous about it. That is why we should already have been well educated in what way to accept every one” (*Met.* II 3 995^a8–13). **The nature of the subject matter allows:** See *IX* 2 1164^b27–28, 1165^a2–3, 12–14.

Note 23

Persuasive arguments (*pithanologountos*) **from a mathematician . . . demonstrations** (*apodeixeis*) **from a rhetorician:** Rhetoric’s end or goal is persuasion (*pithanon*) (*Rh.* I 2 1355^b26), and “the mode of persuasion that has the most control” is the *enthymeme*, which is “a demonstration of a sort” (I 1 1355^a4–8) whose premises are reputable beliefs (1355^a27–28). A demonstration (*apodeixis*) proper, by contrast, of the sort that we find in an exact science, is a valid deduction from scientific starting-points, which are definitions of real essences, so that the predicates belong to the subjects in every case, intrinsically, and universally (*APo.* I 4 73^a24–27). From a mathematician we should expect demonstrations, not persuasive arguments based on reputable beliefs; from a rhetorician we should expect persuasive arguments, not demonstrations from scientific starting-points.

Note 24

Unconditionally (*haplós*): The adjective *haplous* means “simple” or “single-fold.” The adverb *haplós* thus points in two somewhat opposed directions. To speak *haplós* sometimes means to put things simply or in simple terms, so that qualifications and conditions will need to be added later. Sometimes, as here, to be *F haplós* means to be *F* in a way that allows for no “ifs,” “ands,” or “buts.” In this sense, what is *F haplós* is *F* unconditionally speaking, or in the strictest, most absolute, and most unqualified way (*Met.* V 5 1015^b11–12). In this sense, what is unconditionally *F* is what is intrinsically *F* (*NE* VII 9 1151^b2–3).

Note 25

Not a suitable audience for politics: See *X* 9 1179^b24–26.

Note 26

No experience of the actions of life: The prime time (*akmê*) for a man's service in the military is that of his body, which is somewhere between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, while the prime time for that of his soul or his capacity for thought is forty-nine or fifty (*Pol.* VII 16 1335^b32–35, *Rh.* II 14 1390^b9–11), and it is not until then that he has the experience required for practical wisdom (*Pol.* VII 9 1328^b34–1329^a17).

Note 27

Feelings: See II 5 1105^b21–23. **Not knowledge but action:** See II 2 1103^b26–29.

Note 28

Those who lack self-control: Lack of self-control (*akrasia*)—sometimes referred to as weakness of will or incontinence—is discussed briefly in I 13 and more fully in VII 1–10.

Note 29

Ordinary people (*hoi polloi*): Sometimes Aristotle uses *hoi polloi* (literally, “the many,” “the multitude”) to refer simply to a majority of people of whatever sort—to most people. But quite often, as here, he uses it somewhat pejoratively to refer to the vulgar masses (I 5 1095^b16) in contrast to cultivated, sophisticated, or wise people (1095^a21). “Ordinary people” is intended to capture both uses. **Happiness** (*eudaimonia*): See Introduction, pp. liii–lvi.

Note 30

Intrinsically (*kath' hautō* or *auto kath' hautō*): Something is intrinsically F or (literally) F “all by itself” or F *in its own right* or (Latin) *per se* F if it is F unconditionally, or because of what it itself essentially is. Thus Socrates is intrinsically rational, since being rational is part of being human and Socrates is essentially human, but he is not intrinsically musical, since being musical is not part of what it is to be human.

Note 31

Presumably (*isōs*): *Isōs* sometimes, as here, signals a presumption or probability that such-and-such is the case, and is translated “presumably.” But sometimes it signals tentativeness and is translated “perhaps.” **Seem to have some argument for them:** “To investigate all the beliefs about happiness held by different people is superfluous, since little children, sick people, and lunatics apparently have many views, but no one with any understanding would go through them. For these people need not arguments but, in some cases, time in which to mature, in others, medical or political correction [or punishment]—for a medical treatment is no less correctional than a flogging. Similarly there is no need to investigate the beliefs of the majority, since they speak baselessly on pretty much every topic but most of all this one. On it, only the beliefs of wise people need be investigated. . . . But since there are puzzles concerning every subject,

it is clear that there are also puzzles about the most excellent life (*kratistou biou*) and the best life activity (*zôês tês aristês*). So it is good to investigate the beliefs they hold, since the refutations of the arguments of those who dispute a certain view are demonstrations of the opposing arguments” (EE I 3 1214^b28–1215^a7).

Note 32

Starting-point (*archê*): “The starting-points, though small in magnitude, are great in power. In fact this is what it is for something to be a starting-point—that it is itself the cause of many things, with nothing above it being a cause of it” (GA V 7 788^a14–16). Starting-points (or first principles) include substance, nature, the elements (earth, water, air, fire, ether), the various types of causal factors (formal, final, efficient, material), as well as practical thought and deliberate choice (*Met.* V 1 1013^a16–23). The starting-points referred to here are those of a science, which are of two kinds (*APo.* I 10 76^a37–^b22). Those special to it are definitions of the real (as opposed to nominal) essences of the beings with which the science deals (II 3 90^b24, II 10 93^b29–94^a19). Because these are definitions by genus and differentiae (II 13 96^a20–97^b39), a single science must deal with a single genus (I 7 75^b10–11, I 23 84^b17–18, 28 87^a38–39). Other starting-points (so-called axioms) are common to all or many sciences (I 2 72^a14–24, I 32 88^a36–^b3). A third sort of starting-point posits the existence of the genus with which the science deals but may often be left implicit if its existence is clear (I 10 76^b17–18).

Note 33

Some are knowable to us, some unconditionally: “All learning comes about in this way, proceeding through what is by nature less knowable toward what is more knowable. And just as in practical matters our work is to start from what is good for each and make what is entirely [= unconditionally] good also good for each, so here it is our work to start from what is more knowable to us and make what is knowable by nature also knowable to us. Now what is knowable to each person at first is often knowable to a very small extent and possesses little or nothing of what is real [or true]. All the same, we must start from what is but badly knowable to us and try, as I said, to proceed through this to a knowledge of what is entirely knowable” (*Met.* VII 3 1029^b3–12).

Note 34

We must be nobly brought up: See X 9 1179^b11–1180^a1.

Note 35

The starting-point is the fact that something is so: See I 7 1098^a34–^b3. **Do not also need an explanation of why it is so** (*to dioti*): If we have been brought up with sufficiently good habits, we will accept that certain things are noble and good without explanation, as a botanist recognizes that certain plants are nettles or thistles. At that point, we are ready to look for

explanations (*EE* I 6 1216^b26–39). Since explanations supply causes, *to dioti* is specifically a causal explanation.

Note 36

Hesiod (c. 700 BC): One of the oldest known Greek poets, author of the *Theogony*, *Works and Days* (of which Aristotle cites lines 293, 295–297), and the *Catalogue of Women*. His works, like those of Homer, played a substantial role in Greek education.

Note 37

Where we digressed: At 1095^a22.

Note 38

From their lives: See X 8 1179^a17–22.

Note 39

Contemplative (*theôrêtikos*): The adjective *theôrêtikos* is usually translated as “contemplative” when applied, as here, to a type of life or activity (X 7 1177^a18) in contrast to a practical (*praktikos*) one or one focused on doing actions, but as “theoretical,” when applied to a type of science or thought (VI 2 1139^a27). While in many ways apt, this opposition is also somewhat misleading. For what makes something *praktikos* for Aristotle is that it is appropriately related to *praxis* or action, considered as an end choiceworthy because of itself, and not—as with “practical”—that it is opposed to what is theoretical, speculative, or ideal. Hence *theôrêtikos* activities are more *praktikos* than those that are widely considered to be most so: “It is not necessary, as some suppose, for a *praktikos* life to involve relations with other people, nor are those thoughts alone *praktikos* that we engage in for the sake of the consequences that come from *praxeis*, on the contrary, much more so are the *theôrêtikos* activities and thoughts that are their own ends and are engaged in for their own sake. For *eupraxia* [doing well in action] is the end, so that *praxis* of a sort is too” (*Pol.* VII 3 1325^b16–21). If some things are *praktikos*, because, like practical ones, they are useful, effective, or feasible means to some end, others are yet more *praktikos* because they further an end by constituting it or being identical to it: “we term both health and wealth as *prakton*, as well as the actions we do for their sake, the ones that further health or the making of money, so it is clear that happiness should be set down as the best for human beings of things *prakton*” (*EE* I 7 1217^a37–40). So even though theoretical wisdom is not intrinsically concerned with “any of the things from which a human being will come to be happy” (*NE* VI 12 1143^b19–20), because it is itself what complete happiness consists in (X 7), it is much more practical even than the practical wisdom that does contemplate them.

Note 40

Many of those in positions of power: The thought is that if powerful people—who can, presumably, live any way they like—choose the life of indulgence, then the majority have a reason to make the same choice. The

views of the powerful about what happiness is are therefore worth considering (1095^a30), even if they are finally rejected (X 8 1178^b33–1179^a17). **Sardanapalus:** An Assyrian king (669–626 BC) whose luxurious lifestyle was legendary. Aristotle also uses him as an example of this sort at *EE* I 5 1216^a16–19.

Note 41

Properly belongs (*oikeios*): *Oikeios* derives from *oikos* (“household”), so that what is *oikeios* to someone belongs to him or is properly his own in the way his family belongs to him or is properly his own. Whether wealth is *oikeios* or not “depends on who has the power of its disposal, and by disposal I mean gift or sale” (*Rh.* I 5 1361^a21–22).

Note 42

Practically-wise people: Practical wisdom is discussed primarily in VI 5, 7–13. **Virtue** (*aretê*): Anything that has a function (*ergon*) has a correlative *aretê*. Thus it is possible to speak of the *aretê* of thieves, scandalmongers, and other bad things that are good at doing what they do (*Met.* V 16 1021^b12–23), as well as of the *aretê* of nonliving tools and instruments. For this reason *aretê* is often nowadays translated as “excellence.” An advantage of the traditional translation “virtue” is that it preserves the link with so-called virtue ethics.

Note 43

Thesis (*thesis*): The word may be used in the technical sense in which a *thesis* is “a supposition of some eminent philosopher that is contrary to common belief (*paradoxos*)” (*Top.* I 11 104^b19–20). **At all costs:** Compare VII 13 1153^b19–21.

Note 44

Works that are in circulation: Works, perhaps by Aristotle, which, like “external accounts,” were available outside the Lyceum.

Note 45

Moneymaker (*chrêmatistês*): A *chrêmatistês* is someone whose life is devoted to accumulating wealth (*chrêmata*), where wealth is anything whose value is measured by money (*nomisma*) (IV 1 1119^b26–27). **In a way forced:** The discussion of actions that occur by force in III 1 1110^a1–4, ^b1–17 requires that their cause lie outside the agent. If that is the idea here, Aristotle may be thinking of the fact that the value of money is conventional and thus lies outside the agent’s own control (*Pol.* I 9 1257^b10–14). Alternatively, since the life of moneymaking is only “in a way” forced, the point may simply be that we do not freely choose money, since we choose it solely as a necessary means to other things.

Note 46

We may set them aside: “We can distinguish between types of lives. Some of them make no claim to this sort of thriving (*euêmeria*

[= happiness]), since they are pursued only for the sake of necessities—for example, those concerned with the vulgar crafts or concerned with money-making or vulgar occupations. . . . But since there are three things thought to lead to a happy life (the ones spoken of earlier as the greatest of human goods), namely, virtue, wisdom (*phronêseôs*), and pleasure, so we also see three lives that all those who have the power to do so deliberately choose to live—the political life, the philosophical life, the life of indulgence. For of these, the philosopher wishes to concern himself with wisdom and the contemplation that is concerned with truth; the politician with the actions that are noble (these being the ones that stem from virtue); and the indulgent person with pleasures that are of the body” (*EE* I 4 1215^a25–^b5).

Note 47

The men who introduced the forms: Plato and some of his followers.

Note 48

Did not furnish a form of numbers: “Further, in things where there is priority and posteriority, there is not some common thing beyond these and separate from them. For then there would be something prior to the first, since the common separate thing would have priority because if the common one were destroyed, the first would be destroyed. For example, if multiplication by two is the first case of multiplication, the multiplication predicated of all of them in common cannot be separate from them, since it would then be prior to multiplication by two” (*EE* I 8 1218^a1–8).

Note 49

Substance: An intrinsic being is a substance (*ousia*) rather than an attribute if and only if (1) it is most of all a primary subject, or “that of which all the others are said” (*Met.* VII 3 1028^b36–1029^a2); (2) it is separate from attributes (VII 1 1028^a23–24); (3) it is primary in definition or account (VII 4 1030^b4–7), nature (V 11 1019^a1–3), scientific knowledge, and time (VII 1 1028^a32–33); and (4) it is a particular “this” (III 6 1003^a9, V 8 1017^b24–25, VII 3 1029^a27–28). **Coincidental:** F is a coincidental (*kata sumbebêkos*) attribute of x if and only if it is an attribute of x but not an intrinsic one. The coincidental attributes of a thing, then, are those attributes that are not part of or entailed by its essence. Being rational is an intrinsic attribute of Socrates since he is essentially human and being rational is part of being human. Being bald, by contrast, is one of Socrates’ coincidental attributes.

Note 50

Category: “The kinds of intrinsic beings are precisely those that are signified by the types of predication (*katêgorias*), since they are said of things in as many ways as being is signified. Since among things predicated of a thing, some signify what it is, some its quality, some its quantity, some its relation to something, some its affecting something, some its being affected by something, some where it is, some when it is, therefore being signifies the same as each of these. For there is no difference between ‘a

man is keeping healthy' and 'a man keeps healthy' or between 'a man is cutting or walking' and 'a man cuts or walks'; and similarly in all the other cases" (*Met.* V 7 1017^a22–30). These kinds of intrinsic being are what we call categories. **The god and the understanding** (*ho theos kai ho nous*): *Ho theos* sometimes refers to (1) the divine being that is Aristotle's closest equivalent to our God. He is defined as *nous noêseôs noêsis*—"an understanding that is an active understanding of active understanding"—or, more familiarly, "thought thinking itself" (*Met.* XII 7 1074^b34–35). This being is the cause of the movement of the various heavenly spheres, also conceived of us as gods, and so of the various sublunary movements they in turn explain, including the generation of animals like ourselves (XII 5 1071^a13–17, 8 1073^a22–^b3). He does this, however, not by being himself in motion but by being the ultimate and unmoving object of wish and desire, who is identical to happiness (XII 7 1072^a26–^b30): "God is in a state of well-being . . . by being too good to contemplate anything besides himself. And the explanation for this is that while our well-being is in accord with something different, he is himself his own well-being" (*EE* VII 12 1245^b16–19). Often, though, *ho theos* refers to (2) the human understanding, which is the divine constituent in the human soul (*NE* X 7 1177^b28): "Human beings possess nothing divine or blessed that is worth taking seriously except what there is in them of understanding (*nous*) and wisdom (*phronêsis*). For this alone of our possessions seems to be immortal, this alone divine. And by dint of being able to share in the capacity, our life, however wretched and harsh by nature, is yet managed in so sophisticated a way that a human being seems a god in comparison with other things. For understanding is the god in us . . . and a mortal life has a part that is a god" (Rose, *Fr.* 61). If that is its reference here, the sense of the clause is "the god, that is, the understanding." *EE* I 8 1217^b30–31 has *ho nous kai ho theos*, where the reversed order of the conjuncts more strongly suggests the identity of the two.

Note 51

Universal: "A universal is naturally such as to belong to many things" (*Met.* VII 13 1038^b11–12). For Platonists such a universal is a "one over many": "[Socrates] Do you want us to begin our investigation with the following point, then, in accordance with our usual method? I mean, as you know, we usually posit some one particular form in connection with each of the manys (*hekasta ta polla*) to which we apply the same name. Or don't you understand? [Glaucon] I do. [Soc.] Then, in the present case, too, let us take any of the manys you like. For example, there are surely many couches and tables. [G.] Of course. [Soc.] But the ideas connected to these manufactured items are surely just two, one of a couch and one of a table" (Plato, *Rep.* X 596a5–b2). Such ones, they thought, were ontologically independent of or separable from the corresponding manys—a view Aristotle rejects: "No universal occurs apart from particulars and separate" (*Met.* VII 16 1040^b26–27).

Note 52

Of all goods there would also be some one science: In *Peri Ideôn*, which exists only in fragments, Aristotle cites and criticizes three arguments the Platonists give for forms, each of which appeals to the sciences. The second of these (79.8–11) is as follows: “The things of which there are sciences, these things *are*. And the sciences are of things other and beyond the particulars: for these are indefinite and indefinable, whereas the sciences are of definable things. Therefore there are some things beyond the particulars, and these things are the forms.”

Note 53

Each-thing-itself: Plato often refers to the form of F as the F-itself. Aristotle thinks this cloaks a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between particulars and universals: “Those who say there are forms are right in a way to separate them, since they are substances; but in another way they are wrong, because they say the one over many [that is, a universal] is a form. The reason is that they do not know how to characterize the indestructible substances that are over and above the particular perceptible ones. So they make the former the same in kind as the destructible ones (since we know those), adding to perceptible ones the word ‘itself’—for example, the man-itself and the horse-itself” (*Met.* VII 16 1040^b27–34); “Platonists claim that there is man-itself and horse-itself and health-itself, with no further qualification—a procedure like that of the people who said there are gods but in human form. For just as the latter were positing nothing other than eternal men, so the former are positing forms as eternal perceptible substances” (II 2 997^b8–12).

Note 54

Pythagoreans: Followers of the philosopher and mathematician Pythagoras of Samos (mid-sixth century BC), after whom the famous Pythagorean theorem is named. Aristotle discusses them at *Met.* I 5, I 6 987^b22–988^a1, I 8 989^b29–990^a32, XIV 3 1091^a13–22. **Column of goods:** The reference is to a column in a table of opposites. The table referred to here may be one constructed by the Pythagoreans (*Met.* I 5 983^a22–26, *NE* II 6 1106^b29–30), although Aristotle himself also makes use of a similar device: “Objects of desire and intelligible objects . . . move without being moved. Of these objects, the primary ones are the same. For that of appetite is the apparent good, and the primary object of wish is the real good. . . . And understanding is moved by intelligible objects, and intrinsically intelligible objects are in one of the two columns, and in this column, substance is primary, and in this, the simple one and an activity. . . . But the good—that is, what is choiceworthy because of itself—is also in the same column, because a best thing is always analogous to a first one” (*Met.* XII 7 1072^a26–^b1). **Speusippus:** Nephew of Plato and eventual head of his Academy (407–339 BC). That Speusippus adopted the Pythagorean view is taken as evidence of its superior plausibility.

Note 55

Contraries: “Things in the same genus that are furthest from them are defined as contraries” (*Cat.* 6 6^a17–18; also *NE* II 8 1108^b33–34).

Note 56

The form will be pointless: The form (*eidos*, *idia*) of F is what answers the question, what is (*ti esti*) F? and thus specifies the what it is of F, or what F is. The point of introducing it is to explain why particular Fs are F: they are F because they participate in the form of F. If nothing participates in the form of the good except that very form, this explanation would go on indefinitely and thus be pointless (compare what makes a desire pointless at *I* 2 1094^a20–21).

Note 57

Homonymy resulting from luck: It is just luck that the word “bank” applies to the sides of rivers and also to financial institutions, so “bank” is a lucky or chance homonym. “Good” as applied to such apparently intrinsic goods as practical wisdom and certain pleasures seems not to be like that. Yet “good” is not said of each of them in accord with a single form, since they are not good in exactly the same way. Two other possibilities seem open. The stronger is that the good of practical wisdom and that of certain pleasures derive from or are related to a single sort of good, as a healthy diet and healthy complexion are both related, although in different ways, to the single bodily condition that is health in a human being—one promoting it, the other being an indication of it. A weaker possibility is that the good of practical wisdom is at least analogous to that of certain pleasures, as sight is analogous to understanding: we see a red billiard ball and see how a mathematical proof goes.

Note 58

Soul: A soul is “the first actualization (*entelecheia*) of a natural body which has life as a capacity” (*DA* II 2 412^a27–28). Since actualization and activity are intimately related, the soul is also “the activity of some sort of body” (*Met.* VIII 3 1043^a35–36). Everything alive, whether plant, animal, or divine being, has a soul.

Note 59

A different branch of philosophy: The branch of philosophy to which the criticism of Plato’s account of forms and the good belongs is identified at *EE* I 8 1217^b16–19: as “of necessity being much more like dialectic, since arguments that are both common [to many subject areas] and destructive belong to no other science.”

Note 60

Separable: “The belief in forms came about in those who spoke about them, because, in regard to truth, they were persuaded by the Heraclitean argument that all perceptibles are always in flux, so that if there is to be scientific knowledge and wisdom (*phronêsis*) of anything, there must,

in their view, be some different natures, beyond perceptibles, which are permanent; for there is no scientific knowledge of things in flux. Socrates occupied himself with the virtues of character, and in connection with them became the first to raise the problem of universal definitions. . . . But whereas Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions separable, his successors did separate them, and these were the kinds of beings they called forms” (*Met.* XIII 4 1078^b12–32). **Doable in action or acquirable by a human being:** See X 2 1172^b34–35.

Note 61

The same conclusion: As at 1095^a16–17 or 1094^b6–7.

Note 62

Complete (*teleios*): The adjective *teleios*, which derives from *telos* (“end,” “goal”), has a number of different senses. “[a] We call [*part-whole*] complete that outside of which not even one part is to be found, as, for example, the complete time of each thing is the one outside of which there is no time to be found that is part of that time, and [b] we also call [*value*] complete that which, as regards virtue or goodness, cannot be surpassed relative to its kind, as, for example, a doctor is complete and a flute-player is complete when they lack nothing as regards the form of their own proper virtue. . . . Further, virtue is a sort of completion, since each thing is complete and every substance is complete when, as regards the form of its proper virtue, it lacks no part of its natural extent. [c] Again, things that have attained a good end are called [*end*] complete, since things are complete as regards having attained their end . . . which is a last thing. . . . And the end and that for which something is done is a last thing” (*Met.* V 16 1021^b12–30).

Note 63

By “self-sufficient,” however, we mean not self-sufficient for someone who is alone, living a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally (*To d'autarkes legomen [1] ouk autô[i] monô[i], tō[i] zōnti bion monôtên, alla kai [2] goneusi kai teknois kai gunaiki kai holôs tois philois kai politais*): The grammar is loose. The logical subject is *autô[i]* (“someone”). He is considered as (1) living alone and as (2) living a political life in relationship with others. The relevant sort of self-sufficiency applies to happiness for him not in (1) but in (2). The sentence, however, applies “self-sufficiency” in (2) not to happiness for him but to happiness for parents, children, and so on. Since their happiness does have an impact on his own happiness (see I 8 1099^b3–6), this may be what Aristotle intends. When he returns to the topic of happiness, however, he claims that the “self-sufficiency that is meant” (presumably here) is found more in contemplation than in anything else, in part because a person can contemplate by himself without (or with minimum need for) other people (X 7 1177^a27–^b1). At the same time, he recognizes that our nature “is not self-sufficient for contemplation,” so that we need other things in our lives

in order to be able to engage in contemplation, even though contemplation itself is an entirely self-sufficient end (X 8 1178^b33–35). It seems, then, that we should understand (1–2, “He is . . . with others.”) as making a cognate point. Family, friends, and fellow citizens are among the external goods (IX 9 1169^b10) or added prosperity (I 8 1099^b6–7) that a person must be provided with first. When he already has these, we can then raise the question of self-sufficiency by asking about what activity, taken in isolation, would make his life choiceworthy and lacking in nothing (1097^b14–15). **Nature:** A nature (*phusis*) is an internal source of “movement and rest, whether with respect to place, growth and decay, or alteration” (*Ph.* II 1 192^b13–15). **Political** (*politikos*): Often the claim is that a human being is by nature a political animal (*NE* IX 9 1169^b18–19), where political animals are those whose function “is some one common thing” (*HA* I 1 488^a7–8). In this sense, gregarious animals such as bees, wasps, ants, and cranes also count as political animals. A human being is more fully political than any of these, however, because he has the capacity for rational speech, whose purpose is “to make clear what is beneficial or harmful, and hence also what is just or unjust. For it is special to human beings, in comparison to other animals, that they alone have perception of what is good or bad, just or unjust, and the rest. And it is community in these that makes a household and a city” (*Pol.* I 2 1253^a2–18). Human beings are political animals, then, because they are naturally *polis*- or city-dwellers (*NE* VIII 12 1162^a17–19, *Pol.* III 6 1278^b15–30).

Note 64

Defining mark (*horos*): The most common meaning of *horos* in the *NE* is “term” in the logical sense, in which a syllogism has three terms. But here, as often elsewhere, a *horos* is what gives definition to what would otherwise lack it (see *Pol.* I 9 1258^a18, II 8 1267^a29, VII 4 1326^a35). A boundary marker is a *horos*.

Note 65

What is added would bring about a superabundance of goods: “How should we look for the best good? Is it to be counted among good things? Surely, that would be absurd. For the best is the complete end, and the complete end, unconditionally speaking, seems to be nothing other than happiness, and happiness is constituted out of many goods. So if in looking for the best one, you count it among the goods, it will be better than itself, because it itself is the best one. For example, take healthy things and health, and look to see which is the best of all these. But the best one is health. So if this is the best one, it will be better than itself, which is a strange outcome” (*MM* I 3 1184^a15–21); “A larger number of goods is a greater good than one or than a smaller number of them, provided that the one or the smaller number is included in the count, since the larger number exceeds the smaller, and what is contained in the larger number is exceeded by it” (*Rh.* I 7 1363^b18–21).

Note 66

Function: A function (*ergon*) is the activity that is the use or actualization of a state, capacity, or disposition, or it is a work or product that is the further result of such an activity. A thing's function is intimately related to its end and final cause: "The function is the end, and the activity is the function" (*Met.* IX 8 1050^a21–22); "each thing that has a function exists for the sake of its function" (*Cael.* II 3 286^a8–9). It is true too that the "good—the doing well—seems to lie in the function" (1097^b26–27 below). But this holds only when the thing itself is not already something bad, since "in the case of bad things, the end and the activity must be worse than the capacity" (*Met.* IX 9 1051^a15–16). Finally, a thing's function is intimately related to its nature, form, and essence. For a thing's nature is "its end—that is, what it is for the sake of" (*Ph.* II 2 194^a27–28), its form is more its nature than its matter (II 1 193^b6–7), and its essence and form are the same: "by form I mean the essence of each thing" (*Met.* VII 7 1032^b1–2). Hence "all things are defined by their function" (*Mete.* IV 12 390^a10), with the result that if something cannot function, it has no more than a name in common with its functional self (*Pol.* I 2 1253^a20–25, *PA* I 1 640^b33–641^a6). Aristotle attributes functions to an enormous variety of things, whether living or non-living. These include plants (*GA* I 23 731^a24–26) and animals generally (*NE* X 5 1176^a3–5), including divine celestial ones (*Cael.* II 3 286^a8–11), parts of their bodies and souls (*PA* II 7 652^b6–14, IV 10 686^a26–29), instruments or tools of various sorts (*EE* VII 10 1242^a15–19), crafts (as here), sciences (II 1 1219^a17), philosophies (*Met.* VII 11 1037^a15) and their practitioners (*NE* VI 7 1141^b10), cities (*Pol.* VII 4 1326^a13–14), and even nature itself (I 10 1258^a35).

Note 67

May we likewise also posit some function of a human being that is beyond all these: "Since every instrument is for the sake of something, and each of the parts of the body is for the sake of something, and what they are for the sake of is a certain action, it is evident that the whole body too is put together for the sake of a certain complex (*polumerous*) action. For sawing is not for the sake of the saw but the saw for sawing, since sawing is a certain use. So the body too is, in a way, for the sake of the soul, and the parts of the body for the sake of those functions for which each of them has naturally developed" (*PA* I 5 645^b14–20); "Each animal, insofar as it is an animal, must possess perception, since it is by this that we distinguish being an animal from not being an animal. As for the various particular perceptual capacities, taste and touch are necessarily present in all animals, touch because of the explanation we gave in *De Anima* [III 12 434^b13–17: 'The body of an animal must be capable of touch if the animal is to survive, . . . since anything without perception that touches things will be unable to avoid some of them and take others. And if that is so, it will be impossible for the animal to survive.'], and taste because of nutrition. For it is by taste that we discern what is pleasant and what is painful where nourishment is

concerned, so as to avoid the former and pursue the latter, since flavor as a whole is an affection of the nutritive part. The perceptual capacities that depend on an external medium, on the other hand, such as smell, hearing, and sight, are found only in animals that can move from place to place. All animals that possess these perceptual capacities have them for the sake of survival, in order that, guided by antecedent perception, they can pursue their food and avoid things that are bad or destructive. But in animals that have practical wisdom they are also for the sake of living well, since they inform us of many differences, from which arises practical wisdom about intelligible things (*tôn noêtôn*) and things doable in action” (*Sens.* 1 436^b10–437^a3). See also *NE* VI 13 1145^a6–11.

Note 68

We are looking for what is special: “People whose function, that is to say, the best thing to come from them, is to use their bodies . . . are natural slaves” (*Pol.* I 6 1254^b17–19); “If a human being is a simple animal and his substance is ordered in accord both with reason and with understanding, he has no other function than this alone, namely, the attainment of the most exact truth about the beings. But if he is naturally co-composed of several potentialities, and it is clear that he has by nature several functions to be completed, the best of them is always *his* function, as health is the function of the doctor, and safety of a ship’s captain” (*Protr.* B65). Since human beings are not naturally simple (*NE* VII 14 1154^b20–22) and do have several functions (I 10 1100^b12–13), the best one will be the one that is special to them. But because human beings have not just a complex nature but also a compound one consisting of a divine element (understanding) and a human one (X 7–8 1177^b26–1178^a23), their special function may—like that of the part of the soul that has reason (VI 1 1139^a17, 2 1139^a29–31, ^b12)—be compound too. Moreover, it will matter whether we are considering male or female human beings, since these have different special functions (VIII 12 1162^a22–24).

Note 69

Next in order is some sort of perceptual living: The *NE* is a sort of politics (I 2 1094^b10–11), and so involves some account of the soul (I 13 1102^a18–19). The reference to an “order” among life activities or functions signals that Aristotle is drawing on his own account: “In all living things that are complete there are two parts that are most necessary, the one by which they take in nourishment and the one by which they eliminate residues [= waste products]. For a living thing can neither exist nor grow without nourishment. . . . A third part [= the perceptual part] present in all animals lies between (*meson*) the most necessary ones, and within it is found the starting-point of their sort of life. Since, then, it is the nature of plants [which are also living things] to be immobile, their non-uniform parts are not of many kinds. For the use of a few instrumental parts is enough for the few actions they perform. . . . Those beings that have perception in

addition to life, by contrast, are more polymorphic in appearance and of these some more than others, and there is still greater variety among those whose nature partakes not only of living but also of living well. And such is humankind, since of living beings known to us it alone, or it most all, partakes of the divine [= reason and understanding]” (*PA* II 10, 655^b29–656^a8).

Note 70

One part has it [reason] by dint of obeying reason, the other by dint of actually having it and exercising thought: These parts are discussed in I 13.

Note 71

“Living” is said of things in two ways: Things can be said to be “alive” when they have a certain capacity or state or when they are engaged in the correlative activity. See I 8 1098^b30–33.

Note 72

Excellent (*spoudaios*): Often, as here, *spoudaios* is a synonym of *agathos* (“good”) but sometimes, when predicated of things, it means “serious,” “weighty,” or “important,” as at X 6 1177^a1–2. **The best and most complete:** An important addendum to this conclusion is added at *Pol.* VII 13 1332^a7–18: “We say, and we have given this definition in our ethical works (if anything in those discussions is of service), that happiness is a complete activation or use of virtue, and not a conditional use but an unconditional one. By ‘conditional uses’ I mean those that are necessary; by ‘unconditional’ I mean those that are noble. For example, in the case of just actions, just retributions and punishments spring from virtue but are necessary uses of it and are noble only in a necessary way, since it would be more choiceworthy if no individual or city needed such things. On the other hand, just actions that aim at honors and prosperity are unconditionally noblest. The former involve choosing something that is somehow bad, whereas the latter are the opposite: they construct and generate goods.” Despite the claim in the opening sentence, nothing quite like this does appear in Aristotle’s ethical works as we have them.

Note 73

Complete life: Sometimes a complete life seems to be one that reaches normal life expectancy: “it is correctly said among ordinary people that a life’s happiness should be judged in its longest time, since what is complete should exist in a complete time and a complete human being” (*MM* I 4 1185^a6–9). But this seems not to be its meaning in the *NE*. See, for example, IX 8 1169^a18–25.

Note 74

Blessed (*makarios*) **and happy:** “Since, as we saw, happiness is something complete, and life (*zôê*) can be either complete or incomplete, and virtue the same (for there is the whole and the part), and the activity of incomplete

things is incomplete, happiness will be the activity of complete life (*zôês*) in accord with complete virtue” (*EE* II 1 1219^a35–39). The next sentence (1219^a39–40) refers to this as providing “the genus and the defining mark” of happiness. *Makarios* is often a synonym for “happy,” but sometimes with the implication of being extremely happy (*NE* I 10 1101^a7) or in a condition like that of the gods (*X* 8 1178^b25–32).

Note 75

Anyone can produce what is lacking: “In the case of all discoveries, the results of previous labors, handed down from others, have been advanced bit by bit by those who took them over, whereas the discoveries of starting-points usually constitute small progress at first but were of much greater usefulness than the later ones that developed from them. For the most important thing in all cases is perhaps the starting-point, as the saying goes. That is why it is also the most difficult. . . . But when this has been discovered, it is easier to add to it and develop the rest. This is exactly what has happened where accounts of rhetoric as well as practically all the other crafts were concerned. For those who discovered the starting-points carried them forward in an altogether small way, whereas those who are highly reputed nowadays are the heirs, so to speak, of a long succession of predecessors who advanced them bit by bit and so have developed them to their present condition. . . . Hence it is no wonder that the craft is of some significance” (*SE* 34 183^b17–34).

Note 76

What was said before: At I 3 1094^b11–1095^a2.

Note 77

About what it is (*ti esti*) **or what sort of thing** (*poion ti*): Geometry tells us what a right angle is—it specifies its essence—its what it is or what it is to be (*to ti ên einai*). Its essential attributes tell us what sort of thing it is. **Contemplator of the truth** (*theatês talêthous*): Plato, *Rep.* V 475e4 describes philosophers as *tês alêtheias philotheamonas* (“those who love to contemplate truth”).

Note 78

The works themselves: The work of the ethicist or politician is in part (*X* 9 1179^a33–35) to provide an outline sketch of the good or happiness, which is a starting-point of ethics or politics (*I* 12 1102^a1–4), that has the degree of exactness appropriate to the relevant subject matter, which consists of noble and just things. The side issues—literally, the things beyond the works (*parerga*)—are the details that can be readily filled in later once the starting-point has been properly outlined.

Note 79

Cause (*aitia*): The distinction between *aitia* (feminine) and *aition* (neuter) is that an *aitia* is sometimes an explanatory argument (a type of deduction) that identifies causes, whereas an *aition* is an item in the world that is

causally efficacious. Aristotle does not systematically observe the distinction, but it is *aitia* that figures in his definitions of craft knowledge and scientific knowledge (*APo.* I 2 71^b9–12, II 11 94^a20–27).

Note 80

Correctly shown (*deichthênai*) . . . **where starting-points are concerned:** *Deichthênai* is the aorist passive infinitive of the verb *deiknunai*, which means “to show” or “to prove.” One way to show something is to demonstrate it from starting-points or first principles, but a starting-point cannot itself be shown in this way, precisely because it is a *first* principle (*APo.* I 3 72^b18–33, 22 84^a29–^b1). Nonetheless it can be made evident (*phaneron*) (*APr.* I 30 46^a24–27, *DA* II 2 413^a11–16) or given “an adequate showing (*dedeigmenon*)” (*NE* VII 1 1145^b7) through the dialectical process of solving the puzzles which, by tying our thought in knots, cloud or darken our understanding of it (*Ph.* VIII 3 253^a31–33, *Met.* III 1 955^a27–^b4).

Note 81

The fact that something is so is . . . a starting-point: Compare I 4 1095^b4–8.

Note 82

Theoretical grasp (*theôrein*): The verb *theasthai*, with which *theôria* is cognate, means to look at or gaze at. Hence *theôria* itself is sometimes what one is doing in looking closely at something, or observing, studying, or contemplating it. *Theôria* can thus be an exercise of understanding (*nous*), which is the element responsible for grasping scientific starting-points (VI 6 1141^a7–8), such as (the definition of) right angle in the case of geometry, or (the definition of) happiness in the case of politics. Hence the cognate verb *theôrein* sometimes means “to be actively understanding” or “to be actively contemplating” something. In these cases, “get a theoretical grasp on” often seems to convey the right sense. **Induction:** “Induction is the route from the particulars to the universal” (*Top.* I 12 105^a13). That is, it begins with perception of particulars and ends with the grasp of a universal by understanding (*APo.* II 19 99^b35–100^b5). **Habituation:** A process, typically involving pleasure (reward) and pain (punishment) by which we acquire a habit that is at once cognitive (as in the case of induction) and conative, because what we experience as pleasurable we tend to desire and pursue and what we experience as painful we tend to be averse to and avoid (*DA* III 7 431^a8–^b10, *NE* III 5 1114^a31–^b3, III 12 1119^a25–27, *Pol.* VIII 5 1340^a23–28).

Note 83

We must investigate it: Probably a reference not just to any starting-point but to happiness, which is a starting-point of the present method of inquiry into ethics or politics (I 12 1102^a1–4). **Things we say:** The things we say about something (*legomena*), or that seem true of it (*phainomena*), or that are thought or believed about it (*doxa*) are starting-points for a

philosophical investigation of it. They need not all turn out to be among the *endoxa* or reputable beliefs that must be left intact, once the puzzles to which they give rise have been gone through. See VII 2 1145^b2–7.

Note 84

They soon clash with a false one: Omitting *ταληθές* (“the truth”). If it is retained, the sense is: “whereas the truth soon clashes with a false one.” **All the data are in tune with a true view, whereas they soon clash with a false one:** “It is well to judge separately the argument of the explanation and what is being shown in it, because . . . one should not always attend simply to things based on arguments, often one should attend more to appearances (*phainomenois* [= *legomenai*])—as things stand, though, if people cannot resolve an argument, they feel compelled to believe what has been said—and because it often happens that what seems to have been shown by the argument, although true, is not true on the basis of the explanation the argument gives. For it is possible to prove a truth from a falsehood” (*EE* I 6 1217^a10–17).

Note 85

Goods, then, have been divided into three sorts, with some said to be external, some relating to the soul, and some to the body: External goods are usually those external to the soul (*EE* II 1 1218^b32–33). But sometimes goods relating to the body are also classed as internal goods (*Rh.* I 5 1360^b1–29). In either case, goods of the soul are superior to goods of the body (*MM* I 3 1184^b1–6, *Pol.* VII 1 1323^a24–^b29).

Note 86

Goods of the highest degree: Since *the* human good—happiness—consists in actions and activities of the soul in accord with virtue (*I* 7 1098^a16–17).

Note 87

Agreed to by philosophers: See Plato, *Euthd.* 279b–c, *Phlb.* 48e, *Lg.* 743e.

Note 88

It is not reasonable . . . most of them: “Human beings are naturally adequate as regards the truth and for the most part they happen upon the truth” (*Rh.* I 1 1355^a15–17); “Each person has something of his own to contribute to the truth” (*EE* I 6 1216^b30–31).

Note 89

Those who say that happiness is virtue or some sort of virtue: Identified at *EE* I 4 1215^a23–24 as “some among the older wise men.” The view that virtue is (or by itself produces) happiness is often attributed to Socrates.

Note 90

State: A state (*hexis*) is the penultimate stage in the development or bringing to completion of a capacity, and is a relatively stable condition (*Cat.* 8

8^b25–9^a13) ensuring that a thing is “either well or badly disposed, whether intrinsically or in relation to something—for example, health is a state, since it is a disposition of this sort” (*Met.* V 20 1022^b10–12). Capacities are of two broadly different sorts, some nonrational, others involving reason. A mark of the ones that involve reason is that they are “capacities for contraries alike,” whereas a single nonrational capacity is “for a single thing”: what is hot can only heat things, whereas medicine can both cure a disease and cause it (IX 2 1046^b4–7; also *NE* V 1 1129^a11–17). When we possess a capacity by nature, we do not acquire it by frequently or habitually doing something, rather, we have it first and are able to do something because we have it, as we see things because we first have sight (the capacity to see), rather than acquiring sight by frequently engaging in acts of seeing. In the case of crafts and sciences, by contrast, we acquire them by engaging in the right sort of activity (II 1 1103^a32–34).

Note 91

And he does discern them that way: See III 4 1113^a31–34, X 5 1176^a15–19.

Note 92

These qualities are not distinguished in the way the Delian inscriptions . . . For the best activities possess them all: The *Eudemian Ethics* opens with this claim (I 1 1214^a1–8). The inscription in question is in the temple on the island of Delos.

Note 93

As we said: Aristotle has not so much said that it is impossible or not easy to do noble actions without supplies as implied that he agrees with it at I 8 1098^b26–29.

Note 94

There are some [goods] whose deprivation disfigures blessedness: Deprivation of external goods impedes the virtuous activities that use them as instruments, and so the happiness such activities—when unimpeded—constitute (VII 13 1153^b9–12). Disfiguring seems to be a different matter and to apply to goods (good breeding, good children, noble looks) that are not so much instruments as features of the agent that impede activities in other ways (note the reference to “goods of the body” as impeding factors at VII 13 1153^b17–19). **Good breeding:** “Good breeding is a combination of ancient wealth and virtue” (*Pol.* IV 8 1294^a21; also V 1 1301^b2); “Good breeding in a race (*ethnei*) or a city means that its members are indigenous or ancient, that its earliest leaders were distinguished men, and that from them have sprung many who were distinguished for qualities we admire. The good breeding of an individual may result from the male side or from the female one, requires legitimacy [in birth and citizenship] on both, and—as in the case of a city—that the earliest ancestors were notable for virtue, wealth, or something

else that is highly esteemed, and that many distinguished people—men, women, young and old—come from the stock” (*Rh.* I 5 1360^b31–38); “Good breeding (*eugenes*) is in accord with the virtue [or excellence] of the stock (*genous*), being true to one’s descent (*gennaion*), though, is in accord with not being a degeneration from nature. This degeneration, for the most part, does not happen to the well born, although there are many who are worthless people. For in the generations of men, as in the fruits of the earth, there is a certain yield, and sometimes, when the stock is good, exceptional men are produced for a period of time, and then again later on [after a period of worthless ones]. Naturally good (*euphua*) stock degenerates into characters disposed to madness (for example, the offspring of Alcibiades and Dionysius), whereas steady stock degenerates into stupidity and dullness (for example, the offspring of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates)” (II 15 1390^b21–31).

Note 95

Just as we said: Most recently at 1099^a32.

Note 96

Luck: What happens by luck (*tuchê*) in the broad sense is what happens coincidentally or contingently (*APo.* I 30 87^b19–22, *Met.* X 8 1065^a24–28). What happens by luck in the narrow sense of *practical* luck is what has a coincidental final cause. If a tree’s being by the backdoor is the sort of thing that might be an outcome of deliberative thought, it is a candidate final cause of action—an end we aim at (*Ph.* II 5 197^a5–8, 6 197^b20–22). If wish, which is the desire involved in deliberation and deliberate choice, is what causes it to be there, the tree’s being by the backdoor is a genuine final cause. If not, its being there is a coincidental final cause. Unlike chance (*to automaton*), which applies quite generally to whatever results from coincidental efficient causes, practical luck—applies only to what could come about because of action and deliberate choice. Hence it is the sphere relevant to action: “Luck and the results of luck are found in things that are capable of being lucky, and, in general, of action. That is why indeed luck is concerned with things doable in action” (II 6 197^b1–2). The sphere of practical luck is also that of the practical and productive sciences (*PA* I 1 640^a27–33, *Rh.* I 5 1362^a2). Goods external to the soul are controlled by luck (*MM* VII 3 1206^b33–34), goods internal to it, such as virtue, are not (*NE* I 10 1100^b7–21, *Pol.* VII 1 1323^b27–29). **Others to identify virtue with happiness:** “To live well is the same as to live justly and nobly” (Plato, *Cri.* 48b8); “The noble and good man or woman is happy, the unjust and base one wretched” (Plato, *Grg.* 470e9–11).

Note 97

To puzzle: Aristotle returns to this puzzle in I 10 1100^b7–1101^a13, X 9 1179^b20–1181^b15. **Training:** See IX 9 1170^a11–13.

Note 98

A different investigation: “Since it is not only practical wisdom and virtue that produce happiness (*eupragia*), but we also say that those with good luck do well, on the supposition that good luck also produces doing well in action and the same things as scientific knowledge, we must investigate whether it is by nature that one man enjoys good luck and another bad luck, or not, and how things stand regarding these matters. . . . Do people enjoy good luck because of being loved, as they say, by a god, so that success stems from something external, so that just as a badly built ship often sails better, not because of itself, but because it has a good captain, in the same way, a person who enjoys good luck has a good captain, namely, his guardian spirit (*daimona*)? But it would be strange if a god or a guardian spirit loved someone like that rather than someone who is best and most practically-wise” (*EE* VIII 2 1246^b37–1247^a29).

Note 99

Disabled: Someone may be disabled as the result of an injury, disease, or accident, or because of a chance natural defect, such as being born blind. No one who lacks virtue because he is disabled in these ways is reproached or blamed for this, although someone who lacks it because he had disabled himself would be (*III* 5 1114^a25–28). The same is true of those who are *by nature* disabled where *full* virtue is concerned. A female, for example, is by nature a sort of disabled male (*GA* II 3 737^a27–28), since in the process of embryogenesis she is formed because of a disabling or deforming of the form transmitted in her male progenitor’s semen by the menstrual fluid of her female progenitor (*IV* 3). Human females, as result, cannot develop full virtue, since the deliberative part of their souls “lacks control (*akuron*)” (*Pol.* I 13 1260^a13). Females thus have a share in happiness that is less than that of males. The same is true of natural slaves, whose souls lack a deliberative part altogether (*I* 13 1260^a12), and may also be true of people in northern or southern climates: “One may pretty much grasp what these qualities citizens should have by looking at those Greek cities that have a good reputation and at the way the entire inhabited world is divided into nations. The nations in cold regions—particularly, in Europe—are full of spirit but somewhat deficient in thought and craft knowledge. That is why they remain comparatively free but are apolitical and incapable of ruling their neighbors. Those in Asia, on the other hand, have souls endowed with thought and craft knowledge but they lack spirit. That is why they remain in subjection and slavery. The Greek race, however, occupies a medial position geographically and thus shares in both sets of characteristics. For it is both spirited and capable of thought. That is why it remains free, governed in the best way, and capable, if it chances on a single constitution, of ruling all the others. Greek nations also differ from each other in these ways. For some have a nature that is one-sided, whereas in others both these capacities are well blended. It is evident, then, that people should

be by nature capable in thought and spirit if they are to be easily guided to virtue by the legislator” (VII 7 1327^b20–38).

Note 100

What we said at the start: At I 2 1094^b7.

Note 101

Its supervision aims above all at producing citizens of a certain sort: Compare I 13 1102^a7–13, II 1 1103^b2–6, X 9 1179^b20–1180^b28.

Note 102

As we said: At I 7 1098^a16–19.

Note 103

Priam: Priam was the king of Troy. His family and city were destroyed by the Greeks.

Note 104

Wretched (*athlios*): *Athlios*, which means “wretched” or “miserable,” often has no ethical connotation (as at VII 7 1150^b5). Sometimes, though, it does have such connotations, so that someone dies in a wretched way when (unlike the case of Priam) he dies in a way that shows him to be a wretch—someone without ethical virtue (I 10 1100^b9–11, 1100^b33–1101^a14).

Note 105

Solon (c. 640–560 BC): Athenian statesman and poet and first architect of the Athenian constitution. The story of his advice (given to the Lydian king Croesus) is recounted in Herodotus, I 30–33.

Note 106

As a sort of chameleon and as someone with unstable foundations: This may be a quotation from an unknown play.

Note 107

As we said: At I 8 1099^b6–7.

Note 108

Estimable: To say that something is estimable (*timios*) is to ascribe a distinct sort of goodness or value to it: “By what is estimable I mean such things as what is divine, what is superior (for example, soul, understanding), what is more time-honored, what is a starting-point, and so on” (*MMI* 2 1183^b21–23). Thus happiness, as a starting-point of ethics, is “something estimable and complete” (*NE* I 12 1102^a2–4). Ordinary people “commonly say of those they find most estimable and most love that they ‘come first’” (*Cat.* 12 14^b5–7). Something is thus objectively *timios* when—like starting-points and causes—it “comes first by nature” (*Cat.* 12 14^b3–5). Since sciences inherit their level of esteem from the kinds of beings they deal with (*Met.* XI 7 1064^b3–6), the “most estimable science must deal with the most estimable genus of beings” (*Met.* VI 1 1026^a21–22). That is why things having to do with the gods are particularly *timios* (*NE* IV 2 1122^b19–21). Finally, because

the most exact science provides scientific knowledge of ultimate starting-points and causes, the most *timios* science is also the most exact one (*Met.* I 2 982^a25–27). **Most of all and most continuously:** Theoretical wisdom (*sophia*) is the virtue of the scientific part of the soul (VI 12 1144^a1–3) and the most exact form of scientific knowledge (VI 7 1141^a9–^b8). Living in accord with theoretical wisdom is the best kind of happiness (X 7–8), the kind most like that of the blessed, and something we are more capable of doing continuously than we are of continuous action (X 7 1177^a21–22).

Note 109

Forgetfulness does not occur: See VI 5 1140^b28–30.

Note 110

Get a theoretical grasp on things in accord with virtue: IX 9 1170^a2–4 mentions getting a theoretical grasp on (or contemplating) actions that are in accord with virtue. Here the context requires it to be the theoretical grasp itself that is in accord with virtue—in particular with the virtue of theoretical wisdom. **“Good, foursquare, beyond blame”:** From a poem of Simonides. Also quoted at Plato, *Prt.* 339b.

Note 111

As we said: At I 7 1098^a12–20. **Base** (*phaulos*): *Phaulos* is often an antonym of *kalos* (“noble”) and is translated as “base.” Sometimes, though, it is an antonym of *agathos* (“good”) and is translated as “bad.”

Note 112

Misfortunes: See V 8 1135^b16–17.

Note 113

In the way human beings are: God enjoys a sort of blessed happiness that, while like ours in kind, is free from the vicissitudes of fortune, continuous, and of a higher degree: “If, then, that state of well-being that we are sometimes in, the god is always in, that is a wondrous thing; but if he is in it to a higher degree (*mallon*), that is still more wondrous. But that *is* his state” (*Met.* XII 7 1072^b24–26).

Note 114

All his friends: Here everyone that is dear to or loved by a person, including the members of his family. Friendship is discussed in VIII–IX.

Note 115

Our deductive argument: A reference back to I 7–8 1097^b22–1098^b12.

Note 116

Praiseworthy: We praise a moral agent or a runner not just for being of a certain quality (virtuous, in good athletic condition) but for doing something as a result of it that we value as good or excellent, such as winning a race for our city or country or doing a courageous action in its defense. “Virtue . . . is a good thing that is praiseworthy. But virtue is thought to

be a capacity for providing and safeguarding good things, or a capacity for repeatedly doing great good things of all kinds and on all occasions. . . . But if indeed virtue is a capacity for doing good (*euergetikê*), the greatest virtues must be those that are useful to others, and because of this people honor most those who are just and courageous, since courage is useful to others in war, justice both in war and in peace” (*Rh.* I 9 1366^a35–b7). **Praise-worthy . . . estimable . . . capacities:** “Goods may be divided into the estimable, the praiseworthy, and capacities. . . . The capacities include rule, wealth, and noble looks, since these are the things that the excellent man can use well and the base one badly. That is why these goods are called capacities” (*MM.* I 2 1183^b20–30). As the human good, happiness cannot be used badly. Hence it cannot be a capacity and so must be either an estimable thing or a praiseworthy one.

Note 117

Works: Here including the activities that are the actualizations of virtuous states of character as well as whatever further works result from these (I 1 1094^a4–6). See 1101^b33 below.

Note 118

Awards of praise involve such a reference: By praising the gods, we imply that the standard to which their actions are referred is human virtue, even though this is absurd (X 8 1178^b8–22).

Note 119

We never praise happiness: “Why is happiness not praised? Due to the fact that other things are praised because of it, either by being referred to it, or by being parts of it” (*EE* II 1 1219^b11–13).

Note 120

Eudoxus of Cnidus (c. 390–c. 340 BC): A celebrated mathematician, astronomer, and philosopher and an acquaintance of Plato’s. Also mentioned at X 2 1172^b9.

Note 121

The god and the good: Compare “the god and the understanding” at I 6 1096^a24–25.

Note 122

Encomia are properly given to its works: “Awards of praise characteristic of virtue are due to its works, and it is to its works that encomia are properly given; and it is the winners who get the victory crowns, not those who have the capacity to win but do not win. Further, it is on the basis of his works that we discern what sort of person he is” (*EE* II 1 1219^b8–11).

Note 123

The starting-point and cause of what is good: See V 11 1152^b1–3. **Estimable and divine:** Something is objectively estimable when—like starting-points and causes—it “comes first by nature” (*Cat.* 12 14^b3–5).

Note 124

Politician (*politikos*): A *politikos* is someone who rules a city using, in the best case, his knowledge of politics (X 9 1180^b23–31), and, in the less than the best case, some approximation to it, much as a doctor is someone who treats the sick using his knowledge of the craft of medicine.

Note 125

Cretan . . . Spartan: The constitution of Crete is discussed in *Pol.* II 7; that of Sparta in II 6, VIII 4.

Note 126

Deliberate choice we made at the start: The choice was to inquire about happiness, so that the appropriate method of inquiry is that of politics (I 2 1094^b10–11).

Note 127

Politics is more estimable and better than medicine: Politics is more estimable than medicine because it is more architectonic, aims at a more estimable good (happiness rather than health), and deals with a more estimable thing (the soul rather than the body). **Sophisticated:** Sophistication here is indicated by an interest in the ultimate starting-points or first principles of one's craft or science: "Of doctors, those who are cultivated and curious say something about physics and claim to derive their starting-points from it" (*Resp.* 21 480^b26–28). These are the doctors earlier described as being more philosophical: "Of doctors who pursue their craft in a more philosophical way, the vast majority begin with physics" (*Sens.* 1 436^a19–b1). Similarly "the politician must have certain defining marks, derived from nature and from the truth itself, by reference to which he will discern what is just, what is noble, and what is advantageous" (*Protr.* B47).

Note 128

External accounts: Also mentioned at VI 4 1140^a2, *Ph.* IV 10 217^b30, *Met.* XIII 1 1076^a28, *EE* I 8 1217^b20, II 1 1218^b32, *Pol.* III 6 1278^b30, VII 1 1323^a21. At *Cael.* I 9 279^a30 we have "the philosophical works in circulation" and at *DA* I 4 407^b29 "the common accounts." The references are apparently to popular works written by Aristotle himself and "in circulation" (*NE* I 5 1096^a3) outside the Lyceum, or to accounts or arguments, not necessarily developed by him, that are generally known. Whatever the precise reference here, it must (as at VI 4 1140^a2) be to accounts with which the audience of the *Ethics* could be safely taken to be familiar. **Another part has reason:** This comprises the scientific part and the rationally calculative or deliberative one (VI 1 1139^a5–15), as well as the understanding, which is responsible for knowledge of scientific and deliberative starting-points (VI 6 1141^a7–8) and so is involved in both of them. It has reason because it is able to engage in reasoning of various sorts and produce reasons.

Note 129

In definition (*logô[i]*): The definition of convex is different from that of concave—alternatively the being (*einaî*) of concave, or what it is to be concave, is different from the being of convex, or what it is to be convex—but in a curved surface the two are inseparable in nature. **Like convex and concave:** In an account of the soul more exact than the one required by politics, it would be important to pursue this question, as at *DA* II 2 413^b13–32, III 9 432^a15–^b7, III 10 433^a31–^b13.

Note 130

Things that appear (*phantasmata*): *Phantasmata* are “like perceptions (*ai-sthêmata*)” (*DA* III 8 432^a9) but, as products of the imagination (*phantasia*) (*DA* III 3 428^a1–2), can persist after actual perception has ceased in the form of small movements that are like those produced by a perceptual object. When someone is asleep, it is small movements of this sort that produce dream appearances (*Insomn.* 2–3). **Decent** (*epieikês*): *Epieikês* is sometimes used interchangeably with *agathos* (“good”) (V 10 1137^a34–^b2), as it probably is here (also IX 8 1168^a33–35, X 2 1172^b10–11). In a narrower sense (defined at V 10 1137^b34–1138^a3), an *epieikês* person is characterized in particular by an attitude to legal justice that pays more attention to fairness than to the letter of the law. What makes an *epieikês* person decent is that he is fair-minded and considerate of others (VI 11 1143^a19–24). When contrasted with the majority (*hoi polloi*), the *epieikeis* are the ones who are better off and more respectable (IX 6 1167^a35–^b1).

Note 131

Nutritive part: The part responsible for the life functions of nutrition and growth.

Note 132

As we said: At 1102^b13–14.

Note 133

Appetitive part . . . desiring part as a whole: Besides the capacity for nutrition and growth, which they share with plants, animal souls possess two further capacities, which must occur together (*DA* II 2 413^b23–24), one “to discern things and the other to cause movement with respect to place” (III 9 432^a15–17). The capacity for discernment or discrimination is due, first, to the possession of a “perceptual part” (*DA* III 9 432^a30), responsible for perception proper and various other functions, such as imagination. In human beings, this part consists of the primary perceptual part, located in the heart, as well as the various perceptual capacities—sight, smell, hearing, taste, touch—and the common perceptual capacity. The part responsible for movement is the desiring part, which comprises “appetite, spirit, and wish” (II 3 414^b1–2). These cause movement or action by being modes of receptivity or responsiveness to aspects of reality that are discerned to be pleasant or painful or, in some other way, good or bad, end-furthering or end-frustrating (III 7 431^b8–10).

Note 134

The reason of our fathers: See X 9 1180^b4–7.

Note 135

Theoretical wisdom . . . temperance: Theoretical wisdom is discussed in VI 7 1141^a9–^b8, comprehension in VI 10, practical wisdom in VI 5 and elsewhere in VI, generosity in IV 1, and temperance in III 10–12.

BOOK II

Note 136

Character: *EE* II 2 1220^b5–7 defines character as “a quality of soul that, though nonrational itself, is capable of obedience to reason by being in accord with a prescriptive reason.”

Note 137

Teaching: Teaching is essentially a linguistic activity: “Certain animals share at once in some learning and teaching, some from each other, some from human beings, these are the ones that have hearing—not just those that hear sounds but those that further perceive the differences between signs” (*HA* IX 1 608^a17–21; also *Pol.* I 2 1253^a1–18, *Po.* 19 1456^b5–7). In the full sense, it involves formal instruction in a craft or science: “Teaching is what those people do who state the causes of each thing” (*Met.* I 2 982^a29–30); “An indication of the one who knows, as opposed to the one who does not know, is his capacity to teach. That is why we think craft knowledge to be more like scientific knowledge than experience is, since craftsmen can teach, while experienced people cannot” (I 1 981^b7–10); “Teaching is argument (*logos*) in accord with scientific knowledge” (*Rh.* I 1 1355^a26). **Experience and time:** Compare VI 8 1142^a11–16.

Note 138

Stone . . . fire: Stone or earth and fire are two of the four sublunary elements Aristotle recognizes; the other two are water and air. Each of these has a rectilinear movement that is natural to it. Thus earth naturally moves down toward the center of the universe, and fire naturally moves upward to the universe’s boundary (*Cael.* IV 4). Unless compelled or restrained, then, a stone will move downward, fire upward.

Note 139

Brought to completion: A virtue is a sort of completion (*Ph.* VII 3 246^b2), so that by acquiring the virtues we complete our functions and ourselves (*NE* I 7 1098^a12–15).

Note 140

Various (*allōn*): An illogical but common use of *allos* (for example, Plato, *Grg.* 473d1, *Phd.* 62a2–3) not to mean “other,” since this would carry the